The Six-Day War stimulated a love for Israel in many Soviet Jews and aroused an interest in their own history, culture, and Zionist ideology. Previously, Soviet Jews had related to their Jewishness in various ways, but for the most part negatively, as a burden, source of shame, and even as a curse. The process of transforming national identification into a positive attribute was accompanied by a powerful eruption of national energy. This energy and the support extended by Jewry in the West andIsraelhelped to restrain the pressure of the totalitarian superpower and served as a promising basis for the unification of forces in the struggle.
There were, however, also causes for disagreements that derived partly from the very nature of a social movement (the discussion of tactics and strategy, the directions of activity, leadership struggles, personal clashes, and so forth) and partly from the complex conditions of refusal. The KGB’s arbitrary will decided who would become a refusenik, trapping certain categories of citizens inside the Iron Curtain and slowing down emigration as a whole. By making the refuseniks’ lives as bitter as possible, the KGB hoped to intimidate others who were contemplating emigration.
The refuseniks’ ongoing discussions about how best to achieve their goals often turned into quarrels and led to serious disagreement. Many polemic arrows were broken in discussions about freedom of choice between aliya to Israeland “neshira” [Hebrew for dropping out] to other countries, about the attitude toward the drop-outs, and the degree and forms of cooperation with the democratic movement. Often the disputes raised the issue of the place of national culture in the movement, the importance of various directions of cultural activity, and the realistic possibility of implementing them in Soviet conditions. Political activism and the moral acceptability of some of its directions evoked certain disagreements. There were differences in the evaluation of specific marginal groups’ activity.
We grew up in an informational vacuum and were accustomed, sometimes blindly, to construct models of our surroundings. Given the differing natures, inclinations, and life experience of people who joined our ranks from various age groups and differing life trajectories, it is not surprising that our models also differed sharply. Moreover, in the majority of cases, we were exploring the unknown, and no one knew for sure what would ultimately prove better and more effective. We discussed and learned on the go, testing the bounds of the possible and experimenting with dozens of variations.
Growing up in isolation behind the Iron Curtain, we had no notion of how the complex Jewish world was structured and organized nor of the various multidirectional forces that supported us. In addition, we had no experience with communal life and, consequently, no acknowledged authoritative leaders.
The KGB adroitly exploited those circumstances and with the aid of agents implanted in our ranks, tried to create an atmosphere of suspiciousness and hostility in refusenik circles. Even though they were not completely successful, sometimes someone was undeservedly labeled a “squealer” or another was vainly accused of shady dealings, misappropriating funds, or moral degradation. Conflicts and mutual accusations of a personal nature would arise, some of which remained even after successful immigration to a new place.
We shall not, however, deal with those issues here. The nobility of the goals and the need to unify ranks in face of common danger helped resolve the majority of such conflicts.
This part of the book will examine various approaches to strategic issues and ideological disagreements in the refusenik milieu. Some have already been covered in preceding sections: the transition from underground samizdat activity to an open struggle; an orientation toward Western public opinion; and the campaign for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This section will begin with the various views on the forms and degree of cooperation with the democratic movement.