President Carter’s failure in the final years of his presidency to carry out his widely-proclaimed human rights program derived from the poorly-conceived implementation of this policy.According to Jeane Kirkpatrick, a professor at GeorgetownUniversity, the approach to communism, which ignores individual freedom on the ideological level, should be different from the approach to authoritarian regimes, in which the violation of human rights is more likely a deviation from the norm.[1] In her opinion, communism was the greater evil. Senator Henry Jackson shared her views. The Islamic revolution inIran in January 1979 that toppled theU.S.’s relatively liberal ally Shah Reza Pahlevi, bringing radical Islamists to power, and the seizure of the American embassy by Iranian students that turned numerous diplomats into hostages were glaring demonstrations of the major failures of Carter’s foreign policy course. The Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan was another blow at the prestige of the American administration. Carter lost by a large margin to Ronald Reagan in the 1980 elections and was considered one of the more unsuccessfulU.S. presidents.

Reagan, in contrast to Carter, initiated a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union.“The culmination came with the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and the crackdown on Solidarity in 1981.Reagan believed that the extension of American power, as happened in postwar Germany and Japan, translated into the extension of the sphere of liberty and that an extension of Moscow’s hegemony led inevitably to tyranny and stagnation.”[2] He christened theUSSR the “evil empire,” an accurate and trenchant description that stuck and became one of the popular clichés of the international media. Reagan announced a doctrine of restraining communist expansion throughout the world that entailed support of movements aiming to overthrow pro-Soviet and anti-American regimes inAfghanistan,Angola,Vietnam,Iran,Cambodia,Ethiopia,Poland, and so forth. He also started a new round in the arms race, assuming correctly that the Soviet Union’s economic potential would not enable it to catch up to the U.S. and such a race could ultimately undermine the Soviet economy.

In order to reinforce the image of the USSRas an evil empire after a decade of détente, Reagan actively alluded to the massive violation of basic human rights in that country.He found an ideological basis for his views in the ideas of neoconservatives─former liberals turned Cold War hawks who viewed the Soviet Unionas an inhuman system that had to be opposed with the same energy exerted against Nazism.The “neocons” included many Jewish intellectuals such as Norman Podhoretz, then editor-in-chief of Commentary, Irving Kristol, and Midge Decter. Their idol was Henry Jackson.[3] The Republican Reagan not only adopted many of Jackson’s ideas but also brought into his administration Democratic colleagues of Jackson who had undergone an ideological transformation and supported the Republican president. Ten years after he began working as a legislative aide in Jackson’s office, Richard Perle became the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Perle’s old friend Paul Wolfowitz became director of policy planning at the State Department. Kirkpatrick’s views became government policy.[4]

Reagan’s determination to utilize human rights as an ideological weapon against theUSSRmeant that the activity of Jewish organizations and ofIsraelin the struggle for Soviet Jewry’s rights was more in tune with the general course of the American administration.The fair wind of world politics filled the sails and the Soviet intensification of repressions only stimulated a tougher reaction by Jewish organizations.

Those of us inside theUSSRfelt that our supporters in the West had succeeded, despite the Iron Curtain and numerous other obstacles, in connecting us to the most sensitive nerve centers of the Jewish world.It was clear to the KGB that when they pressed on that nerve, it evoked an immediate and powerful reaction.

Perhaps those circumstances explain a certain restraint on the KGB’s part in carrying out reprisals against the organized forms of our movement and in the policy of reducing emigration.Legal cases against Jewish activists were, of course, falsified as before, but the sentences, by Russian standards, were relatively moderate.

In the 1980s, Israelcontinued to play a central coordinating role in the struggle for our liberation.Emissaries of Lishkat Hakesher in the U.S., England, France, and Latin America coordinated the activity of Jewish organizations, lobbying at governmental and legislative levels, and a media campaign. The Jerusalem Centre for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry represented a kind of brain trust at the service of Nativ’s (Lishkat Hakesher) leadership. The Israel Public Council for Soviet Jewry worked jointly with Nativ to maintain constant contact with refuseniks and to prepare material for the press. From its inception, Nativ kept an up-to-date card catalogue of activists and their needs and of all in the USSR and Eastern Europe who wished to receive invitations from Israel. A complicated system of direct contacts with the help of tourists and Nativ emissaries guaranteed constant monitoring of the situation on the spot and a direct link with refuseniks and their support within theUSSR.

What did your division do in the 1980s? I asked Yakov Kedmi, head of Nativ’s Soviet Union division from 1981 to 1989.

We processed all information that came from theUSSR: it was received, recorded, systematized, counted up, and analyzed.There were numerous sources of information─refuseniks, activists, telephone conversations, tourists, emissaries, newspapers, diplomats….

Aryeh Kroll, a veteran Lishkat Hakesher worker, kibbutznik, and public figure, worked out a flexible and effective system for training and dispatching emissaries to theUSSR. The system relied on the Jewish youth movements, on Israelis with dual citizenship living inIsrael or in other countries, on Jews in various countries, and onIsrael’s numerous friends among the Christian communities ofSweden,Norway, andDenmark. The head of Kroll’s northernEurope department was Eitan Satt, a kibbutznik, army reserve officer and native Israeli with roots in the Russian Pale of Settlement. Before taking that position, Satt had worked as a volunteer for five years in the Israel Public Council for Soviet Jewry under David Prital.

When did you take charge of sending emissaries? I asked Eitan Satt.

In September 1979. My work was based in European countries:England,Belgium,Holland,Sweden, andSwitzerland.In each country I had one or two helpers who sought out candidates for a trip.Usually they were representatives of labor unions or youth groups in those countries: Habonim, Bnei Akiva, Dror, Hanoar Hatsioni, or Shomer Hatsair.

Did you have to change anything after the Soviet Afghan invasion?

It didn’t influence us at all.Even inRussiaitself, very limited information appeared about the military campaign.The Russians were not particularly proud of what they were doing inAfghanistan.Moreover, we were dealing only with Soviet Jews; we didn’t deal with theSoviet Union.

From September 2-9, 1981, the third International Book Fair took place in Moscow.The Israeli pavilion was incredibly popular with Soviet Jews although the censors confiscated some books of nationalist content.[5]

The famous Israeli singer Sara Sharon, whom we lovingly called “our Sarale,” was a member of the Israeli delegation.Her performances for refuseniks were enormously successful.The other members of the delegation met with refuseniks practically every day; sometimes they would divide up into groups in order to reach several places at the same time.

A wave of arrests started in 1981. Did the tourists that you sent also have difficulties? I asked Eitan Satt.

After the Olympics, theMoscowcustoms agents became tougher.I’m sure that even earlier the authorities knew what we were bringing in, but they also knew that we were not planning to do anything harmful.It became more difficult to break away from one’s Intourist group.Each time we had to make up some story why we didn’t go on the excursion─once it was a stomach ache, then a headache, and then something else.But they understood, of course.

There were also more difficult periods.On occasion our emissaries were beaten.We instructed them in such cases to complain to Intourist and to the police.There, however, they were usually told: “If you didn’t go to places that are off of your planned route, then such things wouldn’t happen.” In the final analysis, however, the worst thing that could happen to them if they were caught “with the goods” was to be sent out of the country on the first plane.When we saw that fromEnglandwe were unable to get one book through, we began to work with Christians from Scandinavian countries who sympathized withIsrael.For a long time the Soviets didn’t catch anyone in this channel.In some instances, we rented an entire tourist boat for ten to twenty families toLeningrad,Riga, orTallinn, and we would load it up with a large amount of books.The boat would stay, for example, for three days inLeningrad.In the morning, the tourists would go out to walk around the city and return late in the evening.They would go out with packs filled with books and would visit Zelichenok, Radomyselskii, and others.More frequently they visited less well-known people.

Did the Christians readily agree to do this?

They were often more fanatic than our Orthodox.They supported and continue to supportIsraelto this day.The Christian supporters ofIsraelsay:  “It is written in our holy books that the Messiah will come only after the last Jew arrives inIsrael.”

Quite a few international scientific conferences were held in the Soviet Union.

Yes, Aryeh Kroll used to send his people to every conference on biology, political science, geography, psychology, and so forth.The participants did not, however, take books or things with them in order not to harm Israelis’ chances of attending in the future.They were able to convey important information to activists or give a lecture at a refusenik seminar.Often the Soviets refused to give Israeli scientists entrance visas.Our friends inAmericathen reached an agreement with Americans and they boycotted conferences if the Israelis were not allowed to attend.

Did you try in any way to direct the activists’ work?

No, rather we tried to protect them from possible dangers.I trained in the Israeli army, where it is customary for our commanders to go in front of their soldiers.When he is unable to do so, as in your case, the soldiers and officers on the spot make their own decisions.They can evaluate the situation better.

Did the Israeli emissaries have dual citizenship?

At the beginning of the 1980s, we sent too many Jews from other countries and not enough Israelis.I felt, however, that emissaries from the Diaspora were not exactly what we needed in the given situation.I wanted predominantly Israelis with dual citizenship to be sent but Nehemiah Levanon did not accept my suggestion.He contended that it could ruin the entire program.I then left and was replaced in 1982 by Tsemach Yakobi.

How many people did you send to the USSR during your work in London?

About eight hundred. That is not countingAmerica.

As I recall, you then returned to this work. When did that happen?

In 1986, Aryeh Kroll was supposed to be replaced.At the time, David Bartov, who was head of Nativ, invited me to take Kroll’s place. I said to him: “I wrote a report about my work that contains proposals for the future. If you agree with them, I am willing. If not, I prefer to remain on the kibbutz with my cows. That’s fine with me.” He agreed. From that time on, every six months, 60-70 Israeli couples with foreign passports would travel to theUSSR. Nevertheless, their passports indicated that their residence was inIsrael.

In comparison to your previous work, what did managing the entire Nativ system of emissaries add?

Not much was added as I was already familiar with the system from my earlier work.Moreover, we sent many fewer tourists from theU.S.andMexico.We practically stopped sending Americans.A few places were retained for members of youth organizations but that was more for educative purposes than practical necessity.We utilized European tourists basically to deliver material─arrive, leave the material, and depart.I didn’t want them to do anything else.The Israelis dealt with meetings and lectures.

How many years did you work in that new capacity?

Until the gates were opened in 1989.

It’s over twenty years since you stopped working in Nativ. What sticks in your memory?

It was an honor to participate in that struggle, and I feel a certain pride in the success that we attained together.And perhaps this will sound strange to you, but I continue to feel a responsibility for you, for your fate inIsrael.

Eitan Satt is now 75 years old.He looks as energetic and fit as before and continues to work in the cow shed.His words about responsibility are sincere.He takes an interest in the fate of those with whom he worked in the distant 1980s, is always ready to help someone in distress, and his home in the kibbutz is open to them.

Nativ established the Israel Public Council for Soviet Jewry in 1970 in order to carry out functions that, because of its specific nature, were not expedient for Nativ itself to undertake. Those functions included a public struggle for Soviet Jews’ right to repatriation, coordination of activities with other public organizations, lobbying among the social and political elite of Western countries, aid in the absorption of new olim, and many other things. Enid Wurtman, who moved to Israel from the U.S. in 1977 after having served in the U.S. for several years as co-chairman of the country-wide Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry (UCSJ or the Union), worked as a volunteer in the Public Council from 1978 to 1993. I met her in 1973 inMoscow and ever since we have shared a strong friendship and several joint projects, including the writing of this book.

How did you succeed in implementing such ambitious goals? I asked Enid.

In terms of lobbying, it helped that influential guests from all over the world often visitedIsraelbecause it is theHoly Land.Every time Congressmen, Senators, members of parliaments, and representatives of the highest echelons of power, including heads of governments, would visitIsrael, we tried to give them information about divided families, prisoners ofZion, and refuseniks.We introduced them to the local friends of those in distress and tried to convince them to work for the release of specific individuals.We also appealed to representatives of foreign states inIsrael.

With regard to personal “adoption,” I, for example, took on personal care of you, Yulii, and your family.As you recall, we had a regular telephone channel.I became the address for everyone who wanted to know something about your family, and when you arrived, I helped you during the first stages of absorption.I didn’t tell you about it, but when you were in refusal, I wrote an appeal asking all the ambassadors inIsraelto support your request to make aliya after so many years of refusal.Other Public Council workers and numerous volunteers mobilized by them did the same.The Council also made placards about all prisoners ofZionand brochures about refuseniks and prisoners ofZion.

Information was, perhaps, the most important part of our work.We received it from the most varied sources and then disseminated it orally and in writing, using all accessible means of communication.We published our own periodical bulletins that were distributed with the aid of Jewish organizations and journalists around the world.

A group of former activists including Aleksandr Feldman, Rafael Nudelman, Aleksandr Voronel, David Maayan (Chernoglaz), and others published a Russian-language journal Sion, which in 1977 split into Sion and 22. Sion was a quarterly. Every two months we published the Scientists’ Bulletin, which reported news, printed analytic articles and information about the activity of Israeli and foreign Soviet Jewry organizations, and conveyed information from the USSR about refuseniks and prisoners of Zion. After the Scientists’ Bulletin, we began to publish a journal Focus Soviet Jewry, which was less reflective and contained more factual information. We sent it to diplomatic representations and foreign journalists inIsrael, Soviet Jewry activists, and also to Jewish community leaders and political figures around the world.

In 1976 we started to publish a Hebrew-language annual, Jews in the USSR,[6] under the editorship of David Prital and Liudmilla Tsigelman, which strived to provide items on the border between academic and publicistic material. We put out a biweekly, Information pages, which we sent to subscribers and to activists, journalists, and Israeli politicians. In addition, we published a quarterly journal Torch, which provided sketches, analysis, and information about Soviet Jews. We produced books and placards for the organization “Mothers for the Freedom of Families with Children,” made placards and brochures for divided families, prepared short biographical sketches of refuseniks and prisoners of Zion,  and we distributed them to Jewish organizations around the world. We sent press releases to the Jerusalem Post, Maariv, Yediot, Haaretz, and to the Jewish Telegraph Agency and we prepared broadcasts in Russian.

Enid, volunteer organizations in the West complained that Nativ did not share information with them and was passive about public actions.

That’s not completely true.The Public Council was Nativ’s offspring and it shared information with both old and new volunteer organizations. We worked, for example, both with theInformationCenter set up inIsrael by former activists and with “Maoz” of Golda Elina. We sent information to the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), the “35’s”, and to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry. We also organized protest demonstrations independently and jointly with other volunteer organizations inIsrael. Don’t forget that I, too, had been a volunteer for many years, directed voluntary organizations in theU.S., and retained many personal links with activists with whom I had cooperated earlier.

We also helped organize demonstrations that were planned by relatives and friends of prisoners ofZionand activists.We prepared exhibitions devoted to activists and set up simultaneous bar and bat mitzvah celebrations for children inIsraeland for the children of activists in theUSSR.

Did you send information to the Soviet Union?

Yes.We sent many letters, greeting cards, and information about holidays to refuseniks.

How many people worked on the staff of the Public Council?

About ten, but we had many volunteers.For example, I founded a group of Israeli volunteers inJerusalembecause I felt it was important for refuseniks to have links with them.There were around twenty people in that group.

Enid, did you have defined functions in the Council or as a volunteer were you able to do what you wanted?

No one imposed restrictions, but I did have very well-defined obligations.For many years I was the coordinator of the Scientists Committee, which dealt with refusenik scientists.We gathered information about refusenik scientists and arranged contacts between them and academic institutes, scientific organizations, and individual scientists inIsraeland abroad, trying to persuade their scientific colleagues to support them.We tried to publicize the situation of refusenik scientists and organized explanatory campaigns at international scientific conferences.For example, if it was a chemistry conference, we asked participants to support their chemistry colleagues in refusal and so forth.We supplied Israeli scientists with information about refusenik colleagues before they traveled to international conferences abroad.Academic institutes inIsraeltook refusenik scientific seminars under their patronage.The Scientists’ Committee for Soviet Jewry, headed by the prominent physicist Yuval Neeman, sent scientific material to those seminars.InIsraelimmigrant scientists received support in finding positions in universities and research centers.

Were there other divisions in the Council besides the Scientists Committee?

There was a section for writers and journalists performing the same tasks as the scientific one, only for refusenik writers.When possible, that section published inIsraelthe works of refusenik writers who were not allowed to publish in theUSSR.We also had a youth section that conducted seminars, lectures, and informational days in schools and connected Israeli youth with refusenik youth.There was a kibbutz section headed by Eitan Satt that dealt with kibbutz “adoption” of refuseniks and prisoners ofZion; when those individuals arrived, the kibbuztim would help with initial absorption.

There was no lack of work.

Yes.In addition we organized festive welcomes for prominent refuseniks and prisoners ofZion, delivered lectures to various groups aroundIsrael, and organized solidarity meetings.We collected photographs of refuseniks and distributed them everywhere.With the blessing of the Education Ministry, the Public Council prepared a booklet in Hebrew that was widely used to familiarize pupils with the topic.Similar organizations in Western countries, working closely with the Public Council, used analogous methods adapted to the local scene.

In addition to the government-financed organizations, several volunteer groups operated inIsraelin the 1980s: “Maoz” of Golda Elina, “Let My People Go” of Eduard Ussoskin, the “Soviet Jewry Education andInformationCenter” (the Center), the religious “Shamir,” and others.The Center was established by several aliya activists.ThreeMoscowactivist friends, Shmuel Azarkh, Yurii Shtern, and Aleksandr Shipov, had the good fortune to leave theUSSRin1981, atime when emigration was highly problematic.Invigorated by their preceding struggle, without losing momentum, they immediately became active inIsrael, where they were joined by Yosif Mendelevich; and Volodia Glozsman, who had arrived back in the early 1970s.

Whose idea was it to set up the Information Center? I asked Shmuel Azarkh.

Most likely it was a collective idea, but the driving force was the Lishkat Hakesher because it didn’t let us work. While still in Moscow, we had sent an appeal to the next CPSU Congress with an enormous number of signatures, but it turned out that the appeal was lying under wraps in Lishkat Hakesher. We then published it with our stipend money in the Jerusalem Post.

Another area of conflict was the issue of neshira. When we left, we were all opposed to it, but after arriving in Israel and discussing the issue, we decided not to fight with people who were still sitting in Russia. Lishkat Hakesher demanded an active struggle against neshira but we refused. Then Dina Beilina joined us. She brought us into closer contact with the U.S. Union of Councils. We began to work closely with Morey Shapiro from theUnion and Rita Eker from the “35’s.” We then met Enid Wurtman, who introduced us to Lenny Shuster, like her, an immigrant fromPhiladelphia. He owned a store and he gave us $500. That was our first funding. I said then: “Guys, let’s get to work.” We registered and began operating as an organization. That was in 1983.

Volodia, were there mainly Muscovites in the Information Center? I asked Glozman.

The five founders were basically Muscovites.We did not have formal membership.The real number of activists was much larger.We dealt with all cities but the basic focus was onMoscowandLeningrad, which corresponded to the level of activity in the various cities.

Nativ’s strategy was to intensify Western pressure on the Soviet leadership. It considered that Israeli moves, especially public ones, were unproductive because of the Soviet leadership’s hysterically hostile attitude toward Israel. Did you take that into account?

We never planned our activities as isolated ones.We arranged them to attract various Western factors, but at the same time, we made it clear that the source derived fromIsraeland that they were public actions.We cooperated with the “35’s” and theUnionand had contacts with the New York National Conference, which although part of the establishment, was rather independent.In the Knesset we worked with the religious and secular and the left and right wings.

You work in the humanities so you had a better chance of figuring out Israeli society.

I was seriously preoccupied with the problematic aspects of Israeli society, particularly the situation regarding immigrants from theUSSR.The Russian aliya had a negative image.I thought that these problems could be resolved by the establishment of a powerful organization.

Volodia, what were the Center’s relations with the Public Council?

The Center had very good relations with Ruth Bar On and several workers of the Public Council when she was the head of that organization; when Haim Chesler took over there was a turn for the worse, the kind of political conflict between organizations that can occur only inIsrael.That was a real fight.

Did you engage in analytic work?

Yes, but it was not the result of a collective effort.Frequently when someone would start writing a report, the others would look on and express their views.

Was your activity directed mainly at work with the media?

Yes and no.Gathering and checking information with a second source, sorting and archiving, that is, arranging matters so the information would be readily accessible.Work with the press, of course, was also an important part of our work.

It took a lot of time, added Azarkh, to build up a good reputation.Toward the end of its existence, the Center was recognized by everyone.For instance, journalists; they knew that we provided verified information and they trusted us─the Israeli and foreign press.Yurii Shtern handled this; he was a natural spokesman.

Glozman continued: We organized our own demonstrations that friends and relatives attended.

Demonstrations in Israel?

Yes, for example, a gypsy ensemble arrived from theUSSR, and we learned that Shimon Peres was attending their performance.We organized a demonstration against Peres with posters: “You are dancing with gypsies and thus stomping on our refuseniks.”

At the time, the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with Israel.

True, yet the ensemble toured here.Sometimes our parliamentarians traveled there.Yossi Sarid went toMoscowand attended the Bolshoi Theater but he didn’t have time to meet with refuseniks.

Did the Lishkat Hakesher accept your center?

Eventually they did.We became like equal partners at the Brussels Conference of World Jewry.Previously, the Lishka invited primarily those refuseniks who spoke like trained bears. We, however, quarreled and fought with them and still attained the status of members of the Brussels Conference.

There were several forums operating internationally that represented a serious headache for the Soviet leadership in connection with the Jewish question.One of the basic ones was theHelsinkiprocess, whose activity was not halted by the new round in the Cold War.On the contrary, it became an arena for heated disputes between East and West.

The Madrid Conference in the Helsinkiframework opened November 11, 1980 and continued until September 1983. Max Kampelman, a Democrat and excellent diplomat who had been appointed to co-chair the American delegation under Carter, shared Reagan’s views about the Soviet Unionas the “evil empire.” Under Reagan he remained as chief of the American delegation with the rank of ambassador and turned the Helsinki process into what it ought to have been from the American point of view─a Cold War instrument for human rights.Kampelman openly condemned both the invasion of Afghanistanand Brailovskii’s arrest as well as other human rights violations.Moreover, he saw to it that his statement was widely covered in the press.He regarded the Soviet Union’s sharp curtailment of exit visas as a conscious manipulation of emigration for political goals.[7] “During the first six weeks, Ambassador Kampelman and his staff publicly cited in the Madrid sessions sixty-five instances of human-rights violations, including almost all of the major refusenik cases. In the course of the next two years, the U.S. delegation cited an additional 250 cases.”[8]

At the first Helsinki Conference in Belgrade, which took place from October 1977 through March 1988, non-governmental organizations did not yet play a significant role.The authoritarian regime in Yugoslaviadid not encourage open demonstrations or active lobbying, and, in addition, the very nature of the conference had not been clearly delineated.The situation at the Madrid Conference, however, was different.On the opening day, the French paper Le Monde carried the headline: “City of Dissidents.” The Spanish capital became a magnet for dissidents and democrats from Eastern European countries along with their Western supporters and human rights advocates. Wives and relatives of Soviet prisoners of Zion and refuseniks mingled with representatives of non-governmental organizations at meetings, demonstrations, and press conferences. Their appeals and posters, audio and video material, books and brochures were everywhere.[9]

Jerry Goodman, executive director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) recalls:

At the time of the Madrid Conference, we had already been cultivating relations with the Washingtonadministration for over ten years.We had done our homework and it would have been a shame not to utilize that in Madrid.We brought the best professionals to lobby the members of the delegations and to work with the press.We rented an apartment in Madridso that Bill Korey, I, and the others could stay there for a couple of weeks at a time.Our task was to exert constant pressure on both friendly and hostile delegations.[10]

The National Conference experts helped draft an all-encompassing document on the situation of Soviet Jewry that analyzed the obstacles to emigration, discrimination in the areas of culture and religion, and antisemitic remarks in the official Soviet press.Copies of this document were presented to every delegation and disseminated at specially convened press conferences at which leading experts from the U.S.and other Western Jewish organizations spoke.[11]

The largestU.S.volunteer organization, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry, was equally active.Its story can serve as an example of how NGOs influenced the political processes related to the Soviet Jewry struggle.

Pam Cohen, then head of the Chicago chapter of the Union told me:

We opened an office inMadridand used it as a base for our work, lobbying delegations and providing informational support for our actions.

Were you personally acquainted with the refuseniks, Pam?

Yes, with many.I first visited the Soviet Union in 1978 with Irene Manekofsky, then president of theUnion.We visitedKharkov,Kiev,Odessa, Moscow, andLeningrad.

In the West, the Jewish establishment declared that the level of emigration justified the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.At the same time, our refusenik sources told us that although the emigration figures were truly high, in several Ukrainian cities the authorities were introducing practically insurmountable obstacles to emigration: they began to close OVIR offices or open them only two to three days a week, despite the long lines of applicants that continued to grow from day to day.TheUnionwanted to verify the facts on the spot.We arrived just after the visit of Senator Ted Kennedy, who had been inMoscowandLeningradand left the Kremlin a list of eighteen refuseniks.

We met Paritskii in Kharkov before he was arrested, Lev Roitburd just after he got out of prison, Kim Friedman, and Lev and Hana Elbert in Kiev, both of whom were subsequently arrested.We met Shcharansky’s brother Leonid near the Choral Synagogue inMoscow.I was standing with you when he approached.I remember Lenia saying that the Shcharansky case was stuck in the throat of theUSSRlike a fish hook: it was impossible to pull it out and it couldn’t be swallowed.

If I recall, at the time you had three little children. How did you manage all this?

Yes, my children were still quite young, but I managed.We moved the office of our organization, Chicago Action, toHylandPark, the suburb where I was living.My husband Lenny helped me.We began to build up a strong volunteer organization.When our former director, Lorel Pollack, retired, I brought in Marilyn Tallman, a teacher of Jewish history and an accomplished orator for the UJA (United Jewish Appeal).She was older and more experienced; together we were an excellent pair.

How did you organize the work of Chicago Action?

I was most interested in what was happening inRussia.When I became the head of the organization, it did not yet have organized files.As that was before computers, we made an index card catalogue containing the basic information about refuseniks: address, telephone, needs, year of refusal, whether he/she was a Hebrew teacher or scientist, when and how frequently had he/she applied for an exit visa or lost a job; was he/she willing and able to receive phone calls from us and willing to meet with our tourists.With these carefully collected data, I created profiles of refuseniks for our personal “adoption” program.As more and more people received refusals and the number of arrests rose sharply, the stream of information constantly expanded, but only two or three people were working in our office.That was not enough to cope with such work.

Were you volunteers or did someone work for a salary?

Only volunteers, Yulii.After the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, we expanded our activity and there was more to do than I could cope with.Realizing that in order to assure support and protection for the refuseniks, I needed to set up a link between American Jews and refuseniks, Marilyn and I initiated a program of personal “guardianship” inChicago.We went to speak at synagogues to convince people to “adopt” a specific refusenik family.

The goal of the program was to establish and develop a broad voluntary infrastructure to support refuseniks.This infrastructure turned out to be a very effective lever of influence on Congress.In the state ofIllinois, there are ten congressional election districts.As a result of our work, each Congressman learned about several refusenik cases from his voters.TheChicagoAction volunteer, Jan Fried, was in constant contact with the congressional representatives fromIllinois, and he briefed them about the fundamental issues concerning Soviet non-compliance with its obligations.We had a multifaceted approach.Usually, people were willing to “adopt” after we had sent or encouraged them to visit theSoviet Union.We then supplied them with documentation about their refusenik and they would carry out work in their communities, with their local press, and with their congressional representatives.The broad volunteer approach demonstrated Chicago Action’s political muscles to the congressional offices: the stream of postcards or telephone calls stimulated by our campaign showed them that we had a serious influence on their voters.Cynically speaking, it was not particularly difficult for the congressman’s office to please his Jewish voters.

At first we lacked the skill and competence to propagandize our ideas among Senators and Congressmen.We learned, however, and ultimately Micah Naftalin, director of the Union, and I used to conduct briefings in the White House, in the State Department, in the Soviet division of the State Department, in Condoleezza Rice’s office when she was the national security adviser, in the CIA, and the Commerce Department.We also testified at numerous congressional hearings: postal hearings, hearings of the agricultural committee, and others.In addition, the leadership of the Union provided valuable testimony on human rights violations in theUSSRat all international meetings of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the framework of theHelsinkiprocess.

After I was elected president of the entireUnion, my interests shifted to the international level’; even before that, however, in the early 1980s, my work with Congressmen and Senators had a nation-wide effect, as I shall explain.My Senator fromIllinoisat the time was Charles Percy, who had the most important position of chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.I developed a close relationship with his assistant, Scott Cohen, who sympathized with our efforts.I can’t recall one request of ours that Percy refused.I remember calling Scott at the end of a work day when I would learn about a refusenik’s arrest and Percy would immediately go to the Soviet embassy to voice his protest.Percy had a special incentive to work for the interests of Soviet Jewry.He was once incautious enough publicly to call Yasser Arafat a moderate leader, thus evoking the wrath of the Jewish community.He consequently was very eager to show the Jewish world that he was not an antisemite.

You thus dealt with three directions: personal adoption, lobbying in Congress, and international conferences.

Yes.Lobbying was directly related to another direction that we have not yet mentioned─the media.We possessed more information than what was reported in the press and we constantly had to think of some way of attracting attention to it.

In what way?

For example, when Yulii Edelshtein was arrested, how could we mobilize a public protest and get the Jewish community and press to cover this event? We organized mock funerals of indifference and apathy.They were our mortal enemies and we wanted to bury them.We rented an old-fashioned wagon to which a horse was harnessed and we placed a coffin on the wagon.The procession passed through the main street ofSkokie,Illinois, with the mayor heading the procession.I told the correspondents that our press attaché Linda Edelstein-Opper, who put out our information sheet, “Refusenik,” was a cousin of Yulii Edelshtein.She then described the events leading to his arrest.Information about Yulii Edelshtein appeared in all the newspapers on the following day.

Trying to address the same problem during Shcharansky’s long hunger strike, the Chicago Action group arranged with the mayor’s office to open a public “Shcharansky Freedom Forum” inLincoln Park,Chicago.Inside a canvas tent, the press recorded the speeches of both senators, the guests of our congressmen, the mayor, and other elected officials.

Once we arranged a public event dedicated to Volvovskii.On a summer Sunday afternoon, families attended Volvovskii Day.We handed out helium balloons with his name on them.People released the balloons into the sky with a message to Volvovskii.We also organized a procession of rabbis with Torah scrolls in front of theChicagomunicipal building and we coordinated a hunger strike of rabbis at the same time as Shcharansky’s.

The fourth direction of your work was with the media.

There were two other things.Our human rights activity required a stream of accurate, verified information that we could feed to Congress and the press.

As I understand it, that is where we come to your conflict with the establishment.

On the whole, yes.We didn’t receive our information from it.We collected our own information and compiled our own list of refuseniks, which was at first typewritten and then computerized.We gave this list to the State Department.When Micah Naftalin and I were in the Soviet Union in 1987, we delegated responsibility for compiling our list of refuseniks to Natasha Stonova and Yura Cherniak inMoscowand Eduard Markov inLeningrad.We tried to set up our own information system.I worked with Rita Eker inLondon(the “35’s”) and David Selikowitz from the Committee of Fifteen inParis.Marilyn and I traveled toLondonandParisto meet with them and set up a network of instructors who would be responsible for preparing tourists to visit refuseniks; the visitors would then transmit reports on their trips to our three organizations.It was a very formal agreement, which led to more reliable information and a quick reaction to refuseniks’ needs.

Did you exchange information with the Student Struggle?

Yes, of course; they were part of our network and gave us a mass of information.

But you didn’t share information with the National Conference?

No.

In the 1980s, did you have contacts with groups of activists in Israel?

When Yura Shtern and Sasha Shipov arrived in Israelin 1981, the Union brought them to our annual meeting in Washington, after which they visited our branches around the U.S.They understood the need for an independent voluntary movement in Israelin order to put pressure on the government and Lishkat Hakesher. Consequently, the Union and the “35’s” began to help with financing this new Soviet Jewry Educational andInformationCenter inIsrael.

Were Shmuel Azarkh and Yosif Mendelevich part of it?

Yes, we worked very closely with them.The majority of the funding came to them from Lynn Singer inLong Island, Rita Eker at the “35’s,” and from us at Chicago Action.Before the establishment of theInformationCenter, the Union had its own representative inJerusalem, Yael Sofios.We needed a local voluntary organization inIsrael, and it was simply great when Sasha and Yura arrived.

Did you maintain contacts with Golda Elina’s Maoz organization?

I read about them but we were not in contact.We were in touch with another former refusenik inIsrael, Lev Utevskii, who prepared excellent analyses for us in English and expended considerable time, energy, and money on translations of important letters of refuseniks fromLeningrad, antisemitic articles, and other information.I was in close contact with him for many years and always relied on his evaluations of the situation.Eduard Ussoskin, head of the group “Let My People Go,” also formerly fromLeningrad, supplied us with reliable information and expert appraisals.He introduced me to a group of Finnish Christians who traveled frequently toRussiaand helped us considerably.

Did you work together with Canadian activists?

We had very good relations with Genya Intrator and with theMontrealdivision of the “35’s,” with Barbara Stern and others.We had working relations with Alfred Reichman, a key figure in everything concerning Soviet Jewry.He introduced me to Rabbi Moshe Sherer from Agudat Yisrael inNew York.They helped us supply refuseniks with computers and other technological aid when that became possible.Via another group, I was in close touch with Martin Gilbert.

The Student Struggle and the “35’s” became international organizations, opening branches in various countries, but the Union was based only in the U.S.?

There was no need for expansion.We completely trusted our overseas colleagues.Moreover, we were ready to work with whoever was ready to work with us.We had close colleagues inEngland,France,Holland, andSwitzerland.Our contacts with refuseniks connected us to like-minded people and organizations with which we cooperated on individual cases and certain political issues.Via one of the refusenik groups, we developed mutually beneficial relations with the organization Ezrat Achim [Hebrew for fraternal aid], the Habad office inNew York.We systematically kept in touch with our colleagues abroad.

Our local volunteer organizations held international meetings.Each fall the Union held its annual convention inWashington, which was attended by the representatives of our branches, the “35’s” fromEngland, and the Committee of Fifteen fromFrance.We periodically arranged meetings in other cities as well:San Francisco,Chicago, andBoston.The Canadians and Belgians also attended the biannual convention of the Union inIsrael.After theU.S.congressional elections (every two years), we would hold a briefing for the new Congressmen.

How often were you in touch with other branches of the Union and with Russia?

At least daily. Sometimes I used to speak with Lynn [Singer] two or three times a day.We contacted each other by fax.There were several people who phoned to Russia, several who collected reports from tourists, and several selecting information that required a quick reaction; the telephones thus were ringing constantly both in our offices and our homes, day and night.The information was immediately dispatched overseas and around the country.

The backbone of our information system was, undoubtedly, the people who instructed tourists and received the reports on their trips and the people who conducted the various briefings.The tourist reports were considered confidential information and a limited number of people had access to them Such reports often revealed sensitive information about refuseniks or about underground activity, and sometimes they contained questionable subjective viewpoints or personal information that should neither be written down nor published.The tourist reports were essential for understanding the internal mechanisms of the movement in the USSR.We were interested in the refuseniks’ opinions, their prospects, expert evaluations, needs, leadership, the expansion of the community, and the trends in the activity of various groups: Hebrew teachers, the kulturniki, teachers of history and tradition, “poor relatives,” [people who couldn’t leave because they could not obtain a document confirming the absence of material claims from remaining relatives] aliya activists, refuseniks on grounds of secrecy, rights groups, women’s groups, groups that monitored OVIR, children in refusal, separated families…. I could go on and on. Our system supplied us with all the information that we needed to support the refuseniks. If something had to be inMoscow at a certain date, we needed a method for assuring delivery. We set up a system of transportation between various sources that was considered confidential because it included material aid. It was an enormous amount of work.

Pam, in order to assure that each refusenik in the USSR received what he needed at the right time, you had to create yet another data base [shortened] of the needs of various groups. Only an establishment group with its unlimited possibilities, probably, was capable of doing that.

Exactly, Yulii. We were not able and did not supply “everyone.” For that reason we established links with competent and reliable refusenik partners.One of those partners would keep a record of everything that we supplied.Frequently we established such reliable links with refuseniks who took responsibility for the needs of one separate group.In some extreme cases, for instance, the loss of a family member, we extended help directly.Supplying necessities and financial aid to prisoners’ families was always a priority.The refusenik community desperately needed not only material help but also spiritual nourishment.We supplied literature about Judaism andIsrael, tapes with recordings of the Torah in Russian, Hebrew textbooks, tapes with Hebrew lessons, and dictionaries—everything necessary for people who were like hostages.We sent you audiocassettes in Hebrew.We also sent medicine, insulin, even a heart valve once.

Who worked out a unified system for instructing tourists?

At the center were Lynn Singer, Rita Eker, David Waksberg, Hinda Cantor, and I.It was a highly professional and effective program.

I know that you also organized telephone calls to Soviet bureaucrats and officials to give them the impression that you knew everything that they were doing to us. Those people had no experience in dealing with foreigners and they did not know whether or not they had the right to cut off the conversation or, on the contrary, to answer the questions that were posed. Considering the Soviet sensitivity to foreign opinion, this seriously unnerved them.

We wanted to create the illusion that we were some kind of octopus with numerous tentacles.They ought to feel our reaction to their every harassment.If they were undertaking some actions against a refusenik, I wanted them to feel a fist next to their face in the shortest amount of time: an immediate and sharp reaction was an attempt to prevent them from taking the next step.

In order to phone or write to Soviet officials you needed to find people who knew Russian.

Correct.With a few exceptions that was Michael Sherbourne and Genya Intrator.We also phoned those who spoke English.In parallel we organized a campaign of letters to refuseniks and postcards to Soviet officials.

Pam, honestly speaking, I find it hard to understand how you were able to run this entire operation without professional workers.

Looking back, I can say that it was amazing.That’s what was meant by a “local volunteer organization.” Chicago Action did not hire professionals.I took a secretary only in 1983.All the branches of theUnionwere run by volunteers who worked, in most cases, from their kitchens.The Bay Area Council for Soviet Jewry was a highly professional organization.They worked effectively and I utilized their activity as a prototype for running Chicago Action.David Waksberg was their professional director although his dedication to the cause and his energy were like those of a volunteer.He raised the level of professionalism throughout the whole organization.The first nationwide presidents of theUnionoperated from their own cities.When Lynn Singer became president, she opened an office inWashington.Irene Manekofsky invited Dmitri Simes to be our representative inWashington.He worked with Congress.

Simes was a professional lobbyist?

In fact, he wasn’t.He emigrated fromMoscowin 1973 and was a noted Kremlinologist who became an informal adviser to Richard Nixon.He was associated with the Carnegie Fund and with various Russian programs and Russian departments in universities.After Dmitri Simes, we expanded theWashingtonoffice to include an executive director, accountant, and office workers.They worked under the direction of volunteer leaders.Stabilizing the activity of the office remained a problem for the presidium for several years—directors came and went until I found and hired Micah Naftalin, a remarkably constructive and talented person.Micah was a lawyer who had worked with a Congressman and then with Elie Wiesel in the Holocaust Commission.He was an experienced and balanced strategist and an excellent negotiator.Moreover, he had a good heart.He worked with theUnionfrom 1986 through 2009.Unlike inWashington, Chicago Action never had a director.We always worked with volunteers.

Tell me, Pam, why were you always so strongly opposed to the establishment?

We were never opposed to the establishment.We had enough to do without that.They were in opposition to us.A big problem was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.All the documents testify to their soft position regarding repealing the amendment.They acted under the instructions of Lishkat Hakesher, as you know, and they wanted to make concessions. In terms of the “carrot and the stick,” they favored the carrot. We did not support rewarding arrests, persecution, and restriction of emigration.

Another issue was the direction of emigration, what you call neshira.

A third problem was quiet diplomacy versus public diplomacy.The former believed in “sha, shtil“─sit quietly, don’t make any waves against our strategy.

Fourth, they were not pleased that the Unionsupported several dissidents, for example, Sakharov.Refuseniks told me that Lishkat Hakesher sent tourists to them with instructions: don’t work with Pamela Cohen because she works with dissidents.

Evidently, they wanted to restrict your activity only to Jewish topics.

More than that, Yulii. I once met with Sarah Frenkel and told her: “We need a strong Zionist movement inRussia.That’s your work.I am sitting inChicago.I can’t build a Zionist movement fromChicagowith the necessary level of trust in my actions.That would be hypocritical.We support the Zionist movement; we send information aboutIsraeland tapes aboutIsraelthat we pack so that they look like nothing is recorded on them.But I can’t be Jabotinsky inChicagowhenIsraelexists and that is its work.

Pam, in our time, you could be a Zionist in any place if you helped Israel and worked to strengthen Jewish identity, which unites our people.

Absolutely, but you have to understand that we were not against a strong Zionist movement; we wanted it inRussia.We felt, however, that our work consisted primarily of helping develop Jewish identity.We even had a program to send Jewish material by mail to further this goal.It was called “The right to identity.” At the same time, we did not support curtailing immigration to the U.S.Ultimately, American Jews did not do enough during World War II to save their brethren, and a person like me could not tell the American government to close the gates to refugees.It was clear that the Soviets knew who was going toIsrael.They could oppose a large aliya but permit immigration to another country.Our leadership considered it morally wrong to advocate blocking entry toAmerica.

Those are entirely normal feelings for a resident of Chicago. From your viewpoint, you were saving Jewish souls. From our viewpoint in Moscow, those who didn’t go to Israel created a threat to emigration and took the place of repatriates in the emigration quota. I have discussed this issue enough. The essence of the problem was that, before there were direct flights and emigration became almost free, emigrants took the place of repatriates.

I agree that there was a quota, but at the same time, I think that the Soviet strategy consisted of presenting emigration as a concession to theUnited States.The Jews immigrating there would be a gift toAmericawhose number would be determined by the U.S.-based HIAS organization.It seems to me that theUSSRmanipulated not only the number of visas but also the direction of immigration.If they were issuing visas to Jews heading for theU.S.in order to obtain concessions from theU.S., then we ought to play that card.If we were able to drag people out from there, then we ought to do so.

Now the time has come for historians to study who was right.

The lobbying activity of NGOs such as the National Conference and the Union and the information that they disseminated facilitated the ability of delegations not only from theU.S.but also from other Western countries, especiallyEnglandandCanada, to raise aspects of the Soviet Jewry situation at various meetings.

In addition to theMadridforum and theHelsinkiprocess as a whole, which undoubtedly were high priority directions of our overseas friends, there were many other arenas in which the lobbying activity of our supporters from the Jewish world bore fruit.These include theBrusselsconferences, parliamentary and inter-parliamentary groups, various scientific and cultural forums, women’s organizations, sports competitions, and so forth.

The 45^th congress of the International PEN Club, for example, adopted a resolution on September 21, 1981 condemning the Soviet government for suppressing the Hebrew language and for attempting to completely destroy the Jews’ spiritual life. The resolution was approved by forty delegates. Representatives of seven East European countries abstained.[12] On May 19, 1981, a month before the trial, 68 scientists from eight countries, including thirteen Nobel Prize winners, formed a “Committee in Defense of Viktor Brailovskii.”[13] On December 29, 1981 a “Committee to Preserve Jewish Culture in the USSR” was formed in Paris that included such well-know figures as Raymond Aron, Simone de Beauvoir, and Elie Wiesel.[14]

On March 2, 1981, the U.S.House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the Soviet Unionto halt harassment, arrests, and trials of Jewish activists, to remove obstacles in the way of emigration, and respect the religious rights of its citizens; on March 4, the U.S.Senate adopted an analogous resolution.[15]

On May 13, 1982 representatives of the movements in solidarity with Soviet Jews from England, France, and Hollandtransmitted an appeal in support of Soviet Jews to Peter Dankert, president of the European parliament in Strasbourg, which was signed by more than a million residents of Western Europe.The European parliament adopted a resolution calling on the ten foreign ministers of the European Union to express their concern to Soviet authorities in connection with the harassment of Soviet Jews and the curtailment of emigration.[16]

On January 25, 1983, an exhibition opened in the House of Commons in Londondevoted to the Soviet authorities’ treatment of the Jews.[17] Meeting in Vienna, the International Psychiatric Association reached a decision to discuss the issue of the use of psychiatry for political purposes. On February 10, 1983, not long before discussion of the issue, the USSR was forced to withdraw from the association.[18] The first international conference of European women’s organizations in solidarity with Soviet Jewry took place in Geneva from February 20 to 22, 1983. Participants included women parliamentarians and senators from Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden. [19] On March 15, 1983 the Third International Conference on Soviet Jewry opened in Jerusalem. Over a thousand delegates from thirty countries took part in the conference.[20] One could bring many more such examples.

During Reagan’s presidency the Soviet Jewry struggle played a more important role than it had previously.A struggle against a repressive communist regime for basic human rights, it fit in completely with Reagan’s argumentation regarding theUSSR.A few months after his inauguration, Reagan invited Avital Shcharansky, who was accompanied by Yosif Mendelevich, to the Oval Office in the White House.

In Reagan’s entourage the understanding grew that discussions on human rights fell on welcoming ears in East Europeand it stimulated the growth of democratic attitudes in those countries.That only doubled the incentive of the American administration to continue its efforts in that direction.