Yuli’s initial interview with Irwin Cotler on July 13, 2007.

Yuli: Irwin Cotler, Canadian hero. First of all, I’d like to hear about your family background.

Irwin: My Father’s family came from Kovno, Lithuania. They’re Litaim. My Mother’s family came from Minsk – Dubrovskaya…

Yuli: We’re all from the same place – the Pale of Settlement. Was your family traditional?

Irwin: It was a traditional family. I grew up as a Jew. Unusual in those days, I grew up in my Grandfather’s home. It was almost a Russian framework. We lived together with my Grandparents and my Mother’s sisters and brothers. The entire extended family lived in one house. My Grandfather was the patriarch of the whole family. He was Orthodox. The rest of us grew up traditional.

Yuli: When and how were you awakened to the problem of Soviet Jewry?

Irwin: In 1962 I was part of a group of students who went to Poland. What happened in those years they had in Canada The World University Fellowships. It was a summer scholarship that they gave to Canadian students every summer. Whoever was chosen went to a different country. That summer in 1962 it went to Poland. I was in Poland for four months. I was in Krakow; Warsaw; even a weekend in Zarkopone. We went to the death camps; Braslav; Posnin and so forth. In the course of that summer I bumped into a number of Jews who had come from Russia to Poland – on the border of Russia and Poland. They said to me… as I was interested in knowing what was happening to Jews in the Soviet Union. I never forgot what they told me. They spoke to me in Yiddish: Mehaben Meir… We’re afraid. And then – Forgessen nish… Don’t forget us! They kept repeating both pleas… Mehaben Meir… and Forgessen nis… I carried that with me… When I came back from Poland I began to interest myself in the situation of Soviet Jewry. In the spring of 1964, we held one of first ever large demonstrations on behalf of Soviet Jewry at McGill University. In fact, I remember that Moshe Dector came to address it and I was a law student at the time. I spoke at the demonstration too. Now I’ll just move fast forward to 1969. That was during the Leningrad Trials.

Yuli: Just a minute. I would like to return before that… Did you know David Hartman, a Rabbi.

Irwin: I knew David Hartman very well. David was the Rabbi of my synagogue. I went with David Hartman to Israel right after the Six Day War in 1967. We traveled together. 

Yuli: Do you remember the Soviet ship Leningrad which was in the port on the shores of Canada? Did Rabbi David Hartman suggest you demonstrate near the ship?

Irwin: David Hartman was very active in Soviet Jewry. He was looking for ways in which to demonstrate. We used to demonstrate in various ways. We demonstrated when the Bolshoi Ballet came.

Yuli: I thought that it was when you were a student – before Poland – in 1961…

Irwin: I was in Poland in 1962. At McGill University – the first ever big demonstration in Canada for sure; amongst the first ever in North America… in May 1964.

Yuli: The sources are lying… I read about a demonstration… It was written in my books in 1961.

Irwin: There may have been one in 1961 that I don’t know about…

Yuli: When did you enter university?

Irwin: In 1957. I graduated Arts in 1961. Then I went to Law School from 1961 to 1964. When we had that demonstration, I served of Chairman of the event. The person who spoke was Moshe Dector from New York. Another person who spoke was Steven Cohen who is now involved in Israel Policy Forum in the states. We had some non-Jews involved with us. That was in 1964 in Red Path Hall. It was absolutely jammed. I remember for another reason. The Canadian Jewish Congress called me up and told me not to hold the demonstration as it would harm Soviet Jews. I said at the time that silence would harm Soviet Jews. I had given my word in 1962 when I met Soviet Jews when they said “don’t forget us” that I would be involved from that day on…

Yuli: The official documents that I read from Canada dated 1961 are wrong…

Irwin: I believe it’s wrong…

Yuli: They mention a demonstration near a ship in a port called Leningrad, not in a hall…

Irwin: I don’t remember any Soviet Jewry events before 1964. I don’t want to say… there may be and there may have been…but I wasn’t part of it…

Yuli: The document said that you participated in the port in 1961 after OK of David Hartman. In 1964, it’s true, you became the founder of the Canadian branch of Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry.

Irwin: That’s correct. !!

Yuli: Now we can move further…

Irwin: With the Leningrad Trials, I was involved and I’ll tell you how… I was then a special assistant to John Turner. He was then the Minister of Justice of Canada. He was very friendly with a famous lawyer in San Francisco by the name of Melvin Belli. Melvin Belli was asked to take up the case of the Leningrad group.

Yuli: They were arrested the 15th of June 1970. We are talking about this period of time.

Irwin: I was then working with John Turner and Belli took up the case. Belli didn’t know anything about Soviet Jewry. The reason he took up the case was because the people in San Francisco knew of his reputation and they thought if he became involved in the case, he would generate publicity. He met with the then Minister of Justice, John Turner and I was with John Turner. I worked with Belli because he didn’t know anything about Soviet Jewry. I tried to assist him on that issue with regard to who the people were; and what the significance was… He was basically using the force of his name and the publicity to try to make this an international matter.

Yuli: It was a time when Soviets were looking very strongly for rapprochement – appeasement with Canada. There were talks about special Canadian- Soviet relationship. It was a good time for Canadian Jews, I understand. 

Irwin: It was a good time for Canadian Jews and also, Pierre Trudeau had become Prime Minister in 1968. It was a good time, also, for Canadians as well as Canadian Jews. Trudeau wanted to further relationships with the Soviet Union. There was also, at that point the visit of Kosygin to Canada and the massive demonstration that took place when Kosygin came to Canada.

Yuli: Did you take part in this demonstration? 

Irwin: I spoke at almost every demonstration that took place whether it was in Montreal, Toronto or Winnepeg or Vancouver throughout the ’70’s. In 1972, we founded the Canadian Academic Committee for Soviet Jewry. I became co-Chair of the Canadian Academic Committee for Soviet Jewry. Shortly thereafter the Canadian Committee for Soviet Jewry was founded as part of Canadian Jewish Congress work. You know Wendy Eisen wrote a book about it.

Yuli: I read Wendy’s book. What happened after the Leningrad Trial?

Irwin: We are involved at that point in a series of demonstrations – massive demonstrations – in terms of Shlach et Ami –Let My People Go – massive demonstrations involving students; academics; community people; scientists. I then was working with the American groups – the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry; and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. They had their own competition between them but I tried to maintain good relations with both of them. To me the issue was mainly how can we help Soviet Jewry. Then came the whole question of the Helsinki Final Act.

Yuli: Trudeau went to Russia in May 16th 1971 in the middle of the wave of arrests and trials – after the Leningrad Trials. He was there when the verdict of the Second Leningrad Trial was announced. How did you use this situation? After that Kosygin came five months later in October 1971.

Irwin: We had huge demonstrations against Kosygin. In the park in Ottawa, we had a huge demonstration. We brought 10,000 people at the time to Ottawa. There were huge demonstrations in Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal – massive demonstrations at the time when Kosygin came.

Yuli: Did you use political leverage?

Irwin: We tried to use political leverage with Trudeau. The only time when political leverage in my view began to work was with the Helsinki Final Act. There were three provisions of the Helsinki Final Act which Trudeau liked to take credit for putting them in -the three under Human Rights. Trudeau said he pushed for “the right to leave”; ‘the right to be reunited with your family”; “freedom of expression and association”. In other words, Trudeau said he was very involved in the human rights basket and in the human rights basket he was specifically involved in those three rights – in terms of freedom of emigration; reunification of families; and freedom of ideas.

Yuli: Freedom of emigration covers reunification of families. 

Irwin: Except Trudeau wanted to use the term reunification of families, as he thought it made the case stronger if you could use a humanitarian case and cause – not only that people wanted to leave but they wanted to leave and be reunited with their families.

Yuli: The Helsinki Act was accepted in 1975. Before that was Jackson-Vanik.. What was your relationship to Jackson Vanik?

Irwin: My relationship to Jackson-Vanik was only through the American organizations.

Yuli: Were you for or against? 

Irwin: I was absolutely for Jackson-Vanik. I was strongly for it and I met with Senator Jackson.

Yuli: When were you born?

Irwin: I was born on May 8th, 1940. 

Yuli: In 1970, you were 30 years old. In 1974 you were 34 years old – already an adult. What were you doing at this time?

Irwin: I worked for a special advisor to the Minister of Justice, an Attorney General from 1968 – 1970 full time. My job was special advisor and manager relating to human rights and constitutional reform; the whole question of law on poverty and legal assistance for the poor. I was involved with the Canadian government. Through my job as Special Assistant to the then Minister of Justice, John Turner with whom I worked very, very closely and he spoke about the issue of Soviet Jewry. I was his speech writer. He would bring up the issue of Soviet Jewry. What happened was in 1970 I went to teach at Osden Hall Law School which was in Toronto but I stayed two days a week with John Turner as Minister of Justice. I would commute between Ottawa and Toronto.

I had a Master’s of Law from Yale University. I had gone through Yale University and even taught at that point. I was at Yale University as a Research Associate in 1967 – 1968. In 1965 – 1966 I went to Yale University and got my Masters of Law degree. In 1966-1967 I came to Israel for a year. I was here during the Six Day War. I was able to see the transformation and impact of the Six Day War on Soviet Jewry. That was a time – just before that Elie Weisel published his book, The Jews of Silence with regard to Soviet Jewry. All these things had an influence on me. I know Elie Weisel from the Soviet Jewry Movement. I met him through the book, Jews of Silence. 

Yuli: As a lawyer, are there many occasions when the question of human rights of a certain group enters the international law of trade? Are there many precedents?

Irwin: No. That was really in my views there were afterwards. Attempts of the Slepak Principle and so on – the attempts to do that afterwards. The Soviet Union was first that I know – the attempts to tie trade to emigration – to link trade with emigration which I thought was a very strong message because the Soviet Union wanted trade and we wanted emigration.

Yuli: It was unique.

Irwin: That’s right. It was unique.

Yuli: I don’t see, in general, that this happens in international practices. Sometimes a country will demand the release of one person or several persons for all kinds of reasons. To link freedom of emigration was certainly unusual.

Irwin: What made everything different then and afterwards was that Soviet Jewry, the case and the cause for Soviet Jewry was a priority on the East-West agenda. We had a unique situation in which both the activists for Soviet Jewry and the American government were on the same side. 

Yuli: It was a unique situation. All the stars were in the right order.

Irwin: All the stars were in the right order.

Yuli: After the Cold War and the Six Day War together made this issue very specific one. I understand that still in the framework of competition and confrontation – socialist and capitalistic blocks made Soviet Jews a good instrument to influence the Soviet government.

Irwin: The Soviet Jews – it depends how one approaches it. There were those who approached it – solely in terms of Soviet Jews – that this was strictly an emigration issue, an aliya issue, a reunification of families issue. Then came the debate whether we should be working for reform within the Soviet Union or we are linked only to the struggle for Soviet Jewry. There were those of us who were supportive of Sakharov and Sharansky. There were people in Israel who were upset with the fact that we were taking up the case of dissidents because we would be undermining the struggle for Soviet Jewry. As long as we stayed with Soviet Jewry, we wouldn’t appear to be anti-Soviet. As soon as we took up the cause of the Helsinki process and dissidents in the Soviet Union or human rights in the Soviet Union, then we were getting involved in the political struggle with regard to the Soviet Union and that would hurt the cause for Soviet Jewry.

Yuli: That’s the main difference between Jackson-Vanik and the Helsinki Act.

Irwin: That’s correct.

Yuli: Jackson-Vanik was directed, I understood, not in words but in deeds directed only for emigration, to solve the Jewish emigration problem because otherwise they would have no relatives abroad and so on. Helsinki Act was to reform the Soviet Union, to liberalize the Soviet Union.

Irwin: On the human rights basket, there were two parts, the part on emigration and reunification of families. The two parts of the human rights basket was similar to Jackson-Vanik although it wasn’t as much in terms of linkage. The third part of the human rights basket – freedom of ideas, the right to dissent and freedom of speech – that took you more into Helsinki political rights – human rights in the Soviet Union struggle.

Yuli: The geography was different. I understand that Jackson was really defining Soviet relations with the US. Helsinki Act defined 35 countries relationships – USA; Canada and all of Europe. It was August 1975. Were you taking part in it?

Irwin: I very much took part in it. I knew Trudeau from the days when I was a Special Assistant in John Turner’s office. Trudeau was Prime Minister. Turner was Minister of Justice. By that time I had gotten involved in the full struggle for Soviet Jewry. In 1975 I was pushing in terms of getting the Canadian government to be supportive of the Human Rights Basket of the Helsinki Final Act. Canada had a strong voice in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 mainly because of Trudeau’s involvement. If I jump ahead a little bit, in 1978 when Sharansky had his trial and Avital came to Canada. We met with Trudeau.

Yuli: You were Sharansky’s lawyer. You took on the case.

Irwin: I took on the case in 1977.

Yuli: He was arrested March 15th 1977.

Irwin: I knew about the case. No one knew about Sharansky but I was tracking his case because he was not only a refusenik, he was involved with Sakharov and the dissident movement and the Helsinki process. He co-founded the Moscow Helsinki group.

Yuli: It was his idea really. He proposed preparing a letter about the violations. I’ll tell you Sakharov whom I met in the Soviet Union who said about Sharansky… Sharansky, from my point of view was involved in four movements. He was involved in the Aliya Movement. He was involved in the Helsinki Movement. He was involved as a spokesperson for Sakharov in the Democracy Movement. He was, also, involved in some of the ethnic and religious rights movements – the Pentacostals and the Ukrainians. That got the Israelis angry because he was involved in all these other movements. He was involved in all these movements – not just the Aliya movement.

Yuli: Let’s turn back a little… I understand that the Soviets were fighting against human rights basket for a very long time. In 1972 they began negotiations… The Helsinki process began in 1972. For years the Soviets were quarreling and bargaining in order not to introduce any human rights because they viewed it as interfering with their internal affairs.

Irwin: That’s right. I was involved in the process because I was still working… The Minister of Justice, John Turner from 1968 – 1972 and then he stayed in government after that… I was working with him full time from 1968 – 1970 and part-time from 1970 – 1972. Then I started teaching at Osgood Law School in 1970 – 1972 three days a week and two days a week in Ottawa. Then in 1973 I went full time in McGill University. I remained close with Turner who was the Minister of Justice to Trudeau and through Turner and my involvement in government I became involved with Trudeau. By then I was the head of the Canadian Academic Committee for soviet Jewry.

Yuli: How did you succeed to push Soviets to this position?

Irwin: The whole idea was to try to push Trudeau along the lines that he was sympathetic to… He was very sympathetic to human rights. He’s the father of our Charter of Freedom and Rights. Trudeau is a major figure in human rights terms. The case for Soviet Jewry had to be made to Trudeau under the rubric of human rights. We made freedom of emigration and reunification of families and freedom of ideas – that this was an international human rights charter – that there more fundamental right than the right to leave; that there was no more humanitarian right than to be reunited with your family; that there is no more fundamental right than the freedom of expression. These were the three things that we emphasized with Trudeau while this was being negotiated with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not paying so much attention to the human rights basket. They were concerned with the security basket in terms of getting their borders recognized and the economic basket in terms of what they could get out of it. We basically almost snuck in the human rights basket under the radar screen. I don’t think they realized – the Soviet Union the implications the Helsinki Final Act would have for their future relationships with the West. I don’t thin they realized that would be a revolutionary Act.

Yuli: It was a revolution. It led to the flourishing of Jewish Culture journals. You helped build the Agreement. How should the mechanism work? Who should monitor that the Soviet Union is fulfilling its obligations.

Irwin: We built the mechanism because we had multiple agreements with the Soviet Union that were all signed further to the Helsinki Final Act. We had agreements with them in areas of trade; agriculture; and human rights. We developed a whole bi-lateral relationship with the Soviet Union based on the Helsinki Final Act as if we were, in fact, implementing the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act.

Yuli: Did you create a Presidium of the Helsinki movement? 

Irwin: Yes we did. I became the head of the Helsinki Watch Group – an NGO. Our responsibility was to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final act to insure that the Soviet Union would abide by their undertakings that it had taken under the Helsinki Final Act. That became for us a framework within which we could advocate to the Canadian government and advocate internationally. In 1978 we then formed the international Helsinki Federation for Human Rights.

Yuli: You have signed an agreement – 35 states. I understand every two years there was a follow-up meeting.

Irwin: We met in Yugoslavia in 1978 and then in Madrid in 1981.

Yuli: What was the purpose of these meetings? When you signed the agreement – was it on a governmental level for the fulfillment of this agreement?

Irwin: We looked upon the Helsinki Final Act as if it was a basic international agreement – almost a treaty of undertakings between the various signatories to the Helsinki Final Act. When, for example, we were making a case against the Soviet Union, we would say that the Soviet Union, as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act, is violating undertakings that it made to us, to Canada as a co-signatory to the Helsinki Final Act. Every time they were denying people the right to leave, every time they were denying people the right to reunited with their families; every time they were putting people in prison for exercising their speech – they were both violating the Helsinki Final Act as an international treaty that they had subscribed to but they were also, violating their obligations to us, to Canada because they promised us they wouldn’t be doing these things.

Yuli: Every signatory to the Helsinki Final Act could apply to the Soviet Union with reflections of certain violations of certain points. That means that an NGO who were interested in certain points, should assemble information and prove their case and apply to their government to apply to the Soviet government.

Irwin: That’s exactly what happened. We were collecting information as the Canadian Helsinki Watch Group. Then we would meet as the Canadian Helsinki Watch Group, as an NGO with the government leaders in Canada and with the Foreign Affairs people. We had a lot of meetings with them at the time – almost ongoing meetings in order to make sure that our government would not relent in pressuring the Soviet Union.

Yuli: There was a Helsinki Watch Group also, in America.

Irwin: In America you also, had the Helsinki Watch Group. They founded it in 1978.

Yuli: Who took part in it and what was their level of influence on the government? I understand it was a lobbying group.

Irwin: It was a lobbying group.

Yuli: You are an international lawyer. There are certain things I don’t understand 
myself – to understand how it worked in reality. What was the group and the level on influence on the government? 

Irwin: We created the group by bringing together in Canada leading academics, scientists, lawyers and journalists. They all became part of this Helsinki Canadian Watch Group. They did the same in the United States. In the US, there was Robert Bernstein. He became the first President of the US Helsinki Watch Group. Jerry Lader was its first Executive Director. We worked very closely together.

Yuli: Did you work with the Israelis as well?

Irwin: Not on the Helsinki issue. The Israelis were not involved in Helsinki… They didn’t like the fact we were involved in Helsinki. They felt it was undermining the cause of Soviet Jewry. Lishkat Hakesher…

Yuli: This is news for me… I will have to investigate this as well… Academics, and journalists – which meant you were planning to work on several fronts – lobbing the government; promoting public opinion…

Irwin: Lobbying the government; working with public opinion; mobilizing the academic and scientific community because of the connection with the people involved in the Soviet Union – the academics; and the scientists among the refuseniks. We, also, established a Canadian Parlimentary Group for Soviet Jewry. We had a Parliamentary group and a group of Parlimentary spouses for Soviet Jewry.

Yuli: I spoke to Yasha Kedmi about the Helsinki process. Relation to Helsinki was of mutual minds. Israel didn’t block the activities of the Helsinki Group but it didn’t support it. You know the reason… Now – I would like to understand better the mechanism of how the Helsinki Watch Group coordinated between themselves and what were their sources of information from the Soviet Union.

Irwin: They worked between themselves because we would get information from the Moscow Helsinki Group which was one important source of information. We got information from the Soviet Jewry groups in America – the National Conference and the Union of Councils or from investigative journalists who were going to the Soviet Union; or we got information by going to the Soviet Union ourselves. That was another possibility. There were various ways to get information. The Helsinki process was very much part of Canadian foreign policy at the time. The Canadian government was collecting information.

Yuli: Was it part of the establishment? Did you have financial backing? Did you have offices?

Irwin: The American Helsinki Watch Group had offices and had financial backing. That eventually grew… After they established various Helsinki Watches – they had Helsinki Watch; Asia Watch; Africa Watch; Mid-East Watch; and then it ultimately became the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. The strongest component for a long time was the first one which was the US Helsinki Watch. As I mentioned Robert Bernstein was an American with lots of important contacts and he was able to raise money for them. The Canadian Helsinki Watch group operated out of McGill University – out of the Faculty of Law. We had a support system from the faculty. The rest of us worked as volunteers.

Yuli: You were the head of the group and you were working from McGill. Did you have a kind of mechanism for coordination? Did you meet at regular intervals? Did you communicate through faxes and bulletins?

Irwin: We stayed in touch with the American Helsinki Watch Group which was a group with important resources and they became an important source of information. We had all the Helsinki groups in the Former Soviet Union at the time which were providing us with information.

Yuli: Every time when there was a follow-up meeting on the Helsinki Agreement – every couple of years you had these meetings – were you assembling then?

Irwin: We were assembling then. For example, in 1981 when we went to Madrid, we were lobbying there for Sharansky’s release. I went with Avital Sharansky to Madrid in 1981. As of 1977, I was already operating as a lawyer for refuseniks. I had taken up the cases by the late ’70’s of Ida Nudel, Yosef Begun, and Vladimir Brodsky. There was a whole group of refuseniks…

Yuli: Vladimir Brodsky was much later…

Irwin: Yes, Brodsky was later… The process which began – began in 1977 and 1978….

Yuli: I understand… The first was the arrest of Begun on March 1st followed 14 days later by Anatoly Sharansky’s arrest on March 15th 1977. Were you active on behalf of Yuri Orlov too?

Irwin: I was also, very involved on Yuri Orlov’s behalf. He was the co-founder with Sharansky of the Moscow Helsinki Group.

Yuli: He was considered a leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group.

Irwin: I worked very closely with him as well.

Yuli: About Sharansky… First, he was accused of espionage.

Irwin: That’s right.

Yuli: You created a mechanism of follow-up of the Third Basket of the Helsinki process. All of a sudden in a couple of years, arrests began throughout Russia and all over the Soviet Union. How did you perceive it?

Irwin: To me this was clearly an attempt to crack down on all the movements at the same time. What Sakharov said about Sharansky was very true. He said Sharansky’s only crime was to tell the truth and tell it in English!

Yuli: Sharansky said he was persecuted because of his English knowledge.

Irwin: That’s right because he then became the voice of the Soviet Union to the West. Sakharov, also, said that the trial of Anatoly Sharansky was the trial of human rights in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wants to quarantine human rights and they felt by putting Sharansky in prison, they could put an end to the voice of the various movements for human rights. Sharansky was a link between the different movements.

Yuli: He was a spokesman for different movements. He was the spokesman for the emigration movement and for the dissident movement because of his English first of all. He was a spokesman, secretary and translator for Sakharov. He was accused of espionage. He was accused by Lipavsky. They spoke about the list of refuseniks and the plants where they worked; and the general directors of the plants.

Irwin: That list of refuseniks was actually not drawn up by Sharansky. It was drwn up by Dina Beilina.

Yuli: That’s true but Sharansky passed it.

Irwin: It was not something that was illegal. All it was – was putting together information and it was not illegal to have that information or to transfer that information. What the Soviets tried to do was convert what Sharansky was doing which was really protected in the Soviet constitution – to convert it to anti-Soviet slander and agitation or to espionage – so that they could claim he was acting as a CIA agent. We had to go to Carter at the time to get Carter to make a public statement which was unusual for an American President to publicly state that Sharansky was never in the employ of and never had association with any of the American intelligence agencies. It was absurd for the Soviets to take someone who was so public and so involved in a public manner to use him as a spy. It’s a total contradiction in terms.

Yuli: But I was told by some Lishkat Hakesher people – that if Sharansky were to do the same in Israel, he would get the same 15 years.

Irwin: No. I don’t know if you ever saw my legal brief, Yuli… Did you ever see the legal brief that I drew up for Sharansky?

Yuli: No, I didn’t.

Irwin: It’s about 800 pages. It’s goes through every argument that there is with regard to Sharansky. I seek to rebut every one of the charges. In fact, for example, I saw there were 20 violations of Sharanksy’s rights even before his trial began, violations of such magnitude that charges should have been quashed even before the trial began. Once the trial began, the charges were as false as they were absurd. Sharansky, among other things, was accused of slandering the Soviet Union. One of the bits of evidence was that he sent a congratulatory telegram…

Yuli: It was clear that the Soviets were oppressing the truth. I’m talking about this problematic list. How did you deal with this? I worked for a secret institution. I was doing rockets – inter-continental and nuclear weapons. I had an obligation. I signed some documents that I will not even meet with foreigners for a certain period of time. You can’t disclose the exact address of the plant. You cannot disclose it to OVIR, only your own one. When you assemble all of them together, it’s clearly secret information. When you give the name of the General Director of these plants to foreigners, it’s very serious. I understand that the idea behind this was to pressure these people when they go abroad.

Irwin: The person who he gave it to – Robert Toth, a journalist, a Moscow correspondent. I interviewed him. I have an affidavit in my legal brief where he says that Sharansky never gave him any secret information what-so-ever. The information that Sharansky gave him was of a public character and could have been collected from the information that was publicly available and that he signed a confession implicating Sharansky because the Soviets had threatened him that he would not be allowed to leave the Soviet Union if he would not sign the false confession. He signed the false confession against Sharansky which he ultimately retracted. Then when I spoke to him, he said he never got any secret information from Sharansky. He was the one of having given the secret information to…

Yuli: Sharansky himself was never in a secret institution. He might not have been aware of information he was dealing with. I think the mastermind behind the creation of this list was Alexander Lerner. He was often abroad before he became a refuseniks and he understood the sensitivity of appearances in the West people who detain Jews inside the Soviet Union who obtained secrecy.

Irwin: I represented Lerner, also.

Yuli: All of us thought Lerner would be arrested first of all, or Luntz.

Irwin: Luntz was part of the whole group too.

Yuli: Or Dina Beilin, not Sharansky, who was the spokesman. Sharansky didn’t deal with the creation of this list.

Irwin: That list was created by Dina Beilin together with Luntz and some involvement of Lerner.

Yuli: How do you read the mind of Soviets when they released Dina, released Luntz and don’t press Lerner and take Sharansky.

Irwin: The only way I could understand it was because they were not seen as popular figures and were not seen as being a being threat. People in the West didn’t know about Dina Beilina or Alexander Luntz. I thought they were heroes – Luntz and Beilina. They put their lives on the line. Dina Beilina, when Sharansky was imprisoned, she stood up and said: don’t put him in prison, put me in prison. She’s a real hero!

Yuli: Did Dina say it during the interrogation?

Irwin: Yes, it’s in my legal appeal brief. She said it when she was in the Soviet Union. I have an affidavit from her while she’s still in the Soviet Union at the time. An affidavit is a personal declaration of the facts. I built the Sharansky case as a clear violation of Soviet Law. How it all connects with the Helsinki process and everything else – in 1978 when Sharansky had his trial at the time, I found out about the trial while I was in Damascus. I was traveling at that time in the Middle East. I read in an English language Syrian newspaper that Sharansky was being put on trial. I rushed out of Syria via Jordan and then to Israel and by then Avital had left to go to North America. I came back to North America and then started to write the legal brief. We finished the legal brief by the end of August 1978. We released it at the time. I served it on the Soviet Union. At the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, we actually had a bailiff and we formerly served the brief on them. Then there was an awful lot of publicity about it in Canada and in the United States. Then a year later the Canadian government supported me in arranging for me to appear before the Chief Justice of the Soviet Union at the time, Justice Orlov. (the President of the High Court in the Soviet Union) I had been in the Soviet Union for 10 days before my hearing was to begin. Sharansky’s parents – around August 14th 1979 – a sunny day, they asked me to visit them in their home. They were having a hunger strike to commemorate their 40th wedding anniversary on behalf of their son, Anatoly Sharansky. I didn’t want to take a chance that the Soviets might expel me if I went to visit the Sharanksys. I asked the Soviet authorities who were hosting me and got permission to visit the Sharanskys and I went in car driven by Professor Alexander Lerner and his wife and Leonid Sharansky and myself. After we traveled about 15 minutes on the way to the Sharanskys home, we were stopped by the Soviet militia. We were pulled over to the side of the road. Then the interrogation began. The only one they were interested in interrogating happened to be me. They even told the others that they could go ahead and that I’d have to stay behind for the interrogation. Professor Alexander Lerner, to give you a sense of how courageous this man was, he insisted on staying behind with me. Now Leonid Sharansky and Professor Lerner’s wife went on to the Sharanskys. I stayed behind with Alexander Lerner. Then they interrogated me for 40 minitues. They tried to get me to sign something entirely in Russian which I sensed was a confession that I was engaged in anti-Soviet activities and I refused to sign anything they gave me. They then took me back to the hotel in Moscow. At that point I was driving back in the car. I was with Alexander Lerner in the back and there were two Soviet officials in the front. Lerner insisted on staying with me as they drove me back to Moscow. This becomes funny. We’re in the back seat of the car. I asked who was in the front of the car. He knew the two people in the front were KGB people. We got near the hotel. I asked Professor Lerner what was going to happen. He looked at me and said maybe they’re just trying to scare you and he started to laugh. I couldn’t understand why.. He said maybe they’re going to expel you. He continued to laugh and he said if they’re going to expel you, tell them my family and I want to go too. Then I said to him what about the meeting? I was supposed to meet with the Chief Justice Orlov tomorrow. He said don’t worry about it. If they expel you, and my family wants to go too… but if they expel you, sitting in my apartment, Chief Justice Orlov, if Professor Cotler were here he would tell you the following and I guarantee there will be a transcript of everything I wanted to say. Then he got very serious. He took my hand. I’ll never forget this. He said, remember, don’t ever let them intimidate you. Whatever they do, don’t let them intimidate you. 

Yuli: It’s forbidden to show them weakness.

Irwin: Lerner said maybe what’s happening to you is not such a bad thing in the end. You’re witnessing in a few hours what for us is daily life in the Soviet Union. Two people came out of the hotel towards me. He grabbed my hand and he said remember, kot yisrael arevim zeh lazeh

Remember: whatever happens – solidarity is what’s important. I was taken into the hotel and someone came you have five minutes to pack and leave the Soviet Union. Then I was driven out to the airport. I couldn’t visit for 10 years afterwards. The only reason I got in 10 years later because that’s the interesting thing – international Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the US Helsinki Watch Group had the first ever visit to the Soviet Union in 1988. It was 9 years later. I was the only one of the delegation who was denied a visa still… This was interesting… When they drove me to the airport, they took me out right to the tarmac… It was a Japanese airliner. The Japanese airliner was fortunately going to London, not to the Far East. As they were boarding me onto the Japanese airliner, the Japanese steward said “your boarding pass sir”… I said I don’t have a boarding pass. I was boarded in unsusal circumstances. I managed to tell them quickly to call the Canadian Embassy. The manager of the Japanese airliner came on the plane. I said call the Canadian Embassy and tell them I’m being expelled and call Dan Fisher, the Moscow correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and tell him I can’t meet him for dinner. I was supposed to see him that night for dinner… What happened was that when I landed in London and I felt terrible because the whole way I was thinking what probably happened to Lerner and Sharansky.. When I got to London, I called my wife, look I’m in London. Don’t tell anyone, I’ve been expelled. I’m very worried about what happened to people in Russia. She said – what do you mean don’t tell anyone, it’s all over the news! Dan Fischer broke the story. I went from not being known by anybody to a major international story. What happened is I then flew back… The Canadian Embassy organized a press conference for me in London. When I flew back to Canada, the Foreign Minister of Canada, Flora McDonald met me at the airport. Then the Canadian government in reaction to what the Soviet Union had done in expelling me suspended all the Helsinki Agreements with the Soviet Union. 

Yuli: What does this mean?

Irwin: There would be no scientific cooperation. All the agreements in science, agriculture were all cancelled.

Yuli: Why did they do this?

Irwin: We took the Helsinki Final Act very seriously. The Canadians regarded my expulsion as being a violation of the Helsinki Final Act. For them this was a violation of the undertakings that the Soviet Union had made to Canada under the Helsinki Final Act and therefore, they suspended all the relationships with the Soviet Union. 

Yuli: What transpired during these nine years when you weren’t permitted to travel to the Soviet Union?

Irwin: I was mainly involved in ongoing advocacy – in Madrid, in the Helsinki Groups. I was a member of a number of different groups. I had the Canadian Helsinki Watch Group. Then we hosted a big meeting in Canada in 1985 as a matter of fact, not only us, but the Canadian government had a big meeting in 1985 to review compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Whatever I could do under the Helsinki Final Act, that was one process. Whatever I could do under the Canadian Academic Association; our Committee for Soviet Jewry – I was Chairman was a second process. I was Chairman of the Canadian Jewish Congress from 1980 – 1983. The struggle for Soviet Jewry was our main activity. I was still the lawyer for Sharansky, Nudel and Begun because they were all in prison. Even from Canada, I was still filing briefs and writing and being involved and so on. I was using whatever association I could have – as a lawyer for the Refuseniks and the dissidents; as an academic heading the Committee of Academics for Soviet Jewry or as the Head of the Helsinki Canadian Watch Group or as the President of the Canadian Jewish Congress or as a Law Professor. All these things were ways for me to continue to be involved and my linkages with the people in the States. I appeared before the US Helsinki Commission in 1978. The US Helsinki Commission was a body set up by the American government to review compliance by the Soviet Union with the Helsinki Final Act. It was a government agency.

Yuli: What kind of punishment could there be if the Soviet Union wouldn’t comply?

Irwin: We did suspension. It meant suspending trade relations. It meant suspending cooperation is fields that the Soviet Union were interested in. The American thing , of course, which was so important was Jackson -Vanik that linked up with Helsinki because the Helsinki process legitimated as a matter of international law – freedom of emigration and reunification of families. Jackson-Vanik tied emigration to he question of trade relations with the Soviet Union.

Yuli: Really Jackson created a precedent and Helsinki legitimized it as a fact of international law.

Irwin: That’s right.

Yuli: We were discussing the period when you were forbidden to visit the Soviet Union.

Irwin: That was the period from August 1979 until 1988. When I returned in 1988, it was only because the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights were making their first ever visit to the Soviet Union. All the members of the delegation received a visa. I didn’t receive a visa. The delegation said if I don’t receive a visa, they will not come. The Soviets then gave me a visa but it didn’t end with that. It occurred again in 1989. Once again I applied to come to the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not want to allow me to come. The Canadian government stopped the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union at the Canadian airport at the time and said that unless they let me in, they won’t let him in. The Soviets gave me my visa again and I was permitted to come in. It happened a third time similarly once again. The Canadians had to pressure the Soviet government and then I was allowed in. It was November 1989 when I came and December 1989 when I came and then again in 1990 when I came. After that there were no problems.

Yuli: It was the autumn of 1988 when you came to Moscow…

Irwin: Yes – the fall of 1988 as I recall.

Yuli: You proposed to apply to the Supreme Soviet with an unusual appeal to release old refuseniks from the Soviet Union. Do you remember? Can you comment? What was the idea?

Irwin: Yes I do remember that… The idea at the time was that under the basic principles. I had at the time a Declaration on the Right to Emigrate based on the Helsinki Final Act and on the basis of the Right to Leave under international law, the Soviet Union was obliged to allow Soviet Jews who wished to leave to be able to do so. If they did not do so, this was in effect the Soviet Union breaching its own undertakings under international law because the Soviet Union was a party to international treaties which in fact protected the right to leave.

Yuli: Did you try to come at the end of 1988 when a symposium on secrecy refuseniks was held in Moscow? Remember that Emil Menzheritsky and Vladimir Prestin opened the symposium on refusals on secrecy grounds.

Irwin: Vlaimir Kislik was part of the symposium too.

Yuli: Kislik created a judicial seminar. Once a week refuseniks were assembling and discussing judicial aspects…

Irwin: In fact, I appeared before that seminar.

Yuli: When?

Irwin: When I was in the Soviet Union. The seminar was running for a long time.

Yuli: Three years.

Irwin: I appeared before it when I came as part of the international Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Group. I appeared again in November 1989 and in December 1989. When was the founding conference for Soviet Jews that took place in Latvia?

Yuli: Do you mean the VAAD of Micha Chlenov? It was March 1989 – in the month I was leaving the Soviet Union. Somewhere about February or March 1989.

Irwin: I was there at that meeting in Riga.

Yuli: Did you deliver a speech there?

Irwin: I gave a big speech there – in Riga.

Yuli: Do you remember the main topic of the speech?

Irwin: I talked about the right to leave; reunification of families and the aliya movment. It was even subsequently printed in a Montreal newspaper. I gave a similar talk in Moscow in December 1989. It was then a memorial lecture that I gave in memory of Wallenberg and Sakharov. Sakharov died in mid-December 1989. We then held a memorial lecture for him in Moscow at the end of December 1989.

Yuli: It was a VAAD session.

Irwin: It was a VAAD session co-sponsored with Moscow State University, McGill University and with Harvard University. We had Western support and Moscow State University at the time. It was a pretty major event because of the co-sponsorship of the events at the time. In fact I have the lecture that I gave. It was printed. I can give it to you.

Yuli: Excellent!

Irwin: It’s quite interesting because of the fact that I was saying these things in 1989 in Moscow.

Yuli: I will have all the materials of this meeting from Chlenov. I would prefer to have your lecture from you because I’m not sure it will appear in the assembly of their documents. Just in case… How did you relate to the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Irwin: I saw the disintegration coming because I thought it was a combination of pressures from without and the dissent from within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev helped move it along by proclaiming he wanted both perestroika and glasnost. That in fact made it easier to argue both for more democracy and more openness; and to argue that any denial of rights was really an assault on both perestroika and glasnost at the same time. By the way, there was an article which I, also, published at that time in the Touro Law Review which contained a lot of my arguments that I submitted to the Supreme Soviet at that time in 1989. I’ll have to get this for you as well. It was all published in the Touro Law Review.

Yuli: Do you have it in electronic form? Can you send it by email?

Irwin: I can try to get it and send it by email to you. When you write, my office will pick it up, and I’ll tell them what to do. I don’t do email, Yuli. They’ll do it for me. They’ll send you both the lecture that I gave in Moscow and also, the article I wrote for the Touro Law Review which is all on Soviet law. It contains my submissions on that point – my email is cotlei@parl.gc.ca. It contained, also, my negotiations at that time with Yuri Reshetov who the Soviet government assigned to negotiate with me for purposes of the release of the refuseniks.

Yuli: There were quite a number of refuseniks in 1990 and Kislik was among them.

Irwin: That’s correct. 

Yuli: I asked my main questions. Would you like to add something?

Irwin: What I want to add has to do with you, Yuli, because I want to say when I first met you, you represented to me the embodiment of a Soviet Jew who had fully internalized in the Soviet Union all that was the core of what it meant to be living as an Israeli Jew. You knew Hebrew. Your entire language, culture, body language even… If I didn’t know, I would have said you were a sabra living in Moscow.

Yuli: We considered ourselves Israeli soldiers behind enemy lines.

Irwin: It was an amazing thing. Then came the time when I was trying to get to your house. It was in the dead of winter. You were having a seminar at your house. I don’t know if you remember that. I took a taxi, having been at a meeting with Yuli Edelstein’s father. He came up to me at the meeting… It may have been with the Helsinki Federation group, I’m not sure. I was going to Moscow a number of times then. He came up to me, dressed as a priest and said: “you know my son”. I looked at him and I wasn’t sure who… He said you represent my son. I tried to figure out who was the non-Jew that I was representing. Then he said: “Yuli Edelstein”. Then I said, that’s right I represent your son. He gave me the directions to go to your house. I arrive in this cab that leaves me off in the middle of nowhere and it’s blinding snow. I’m literally in the middle of nowhere and I’m walking towards what might be some buildings in the distance and I bump into this Chabadnik, Rosenstein and I say to him the address I’m looking for; and he says to me in Yiddish: “Vu gest a Yid?” He was a Chabadnick. He brought me to your house. Did you know Rosenstein?

Yuli: Of course.

Irwin: Do you remember? He came to Israel. He passed away a few years ago.

Yuli: I know. He was a very nice person.

Irwin: He was a very nice person. As he said it was bashert.. He said he was supposed to be walking in a different direction and instead he walked in the direction I was walking in and he found me in the middle of nowhere and he brought me to your house. That was the first time that we really talked at the time.

Yuli: There was a summit between Reagan and Gorbachev…

Irwin: I was in Geneva for the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985.

Yuli: It was in 1988 in Moscow.

Irwin: I was at the one in Geneva in 1985. At that one, Mendelevich was there and he got arrested. I ended up representing five of them before a tribunal in Switzerland. Avital was also, detained at that time too. That took place in 1985.

Yuli: Did you bring an appeal to the international tribunal?

Irwin: I brought an appeal before a Swiss court to get them released. That was in 1985 when we were in Geneva for the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.

Yuli: Why a Geneva court?

Irwin: Because they were in a Geneva jail. They had come to Geneva to protest e.g. Mendelevich – Shlach et Ami – Let My People Go at the time of the summit. I was there with Avital. Avital was picked up and they were arrested. At the time, I appeared before a Swiss Court to get them released. 

Yuli: Tolya was still in prison.

Irwin: He was still in prison. That was the time when I met with the Procuartor General in Geneva who told me that we could expect Natan to be released soon. I remember telling that to Avital at the time and she said: “I heard all these stories. I don’t want to hear anymore of these stories”. I said that I never told you any of these stories that he’d be released soon. My sense was that because they sought me out – the Procurator to tell me that they were passing on a message to me…

Yuli: You became an international figure for defending Assirei Zion.

Irwin: I was involved at that point in an ongoing battle with the various Soviet authorities. I met Gorbachev for the first time after he was no longer the head of the Soviet Union – in New York. I came up to him… Gorbachev came to Canada in the spring of 1985. He had come before a Parliamentary Committee and the Parliamentary Committee were asking questions about Soviet Jews and also, about Sharansky. Gorbachev said he didn’t know anything about it. It was an interesting thing because when I asked him in the mid-’90’s.. I said a little over 10 years ago when you were in Canada you came before a Parliamentary Committee. The Parliamentary Committee asked you questions about Sharanksy. You said you didn’t know about Sharansky. I said the truth. I knew about the situation of Soviet Jews. I really didn’t know about the Sharansky case. After what happened in Canada, I looked into Sharanky’s case. Within a year of my coming to Canada, Sharansky was released.
 
Yuli: You mean when he really saw and umderstood that the Sharansky case as an obstacle to détente.

Irwin: That’s how he explained it to me.

Yuli: Very interesting. I thank you very much Irwin.

Irwin: I want to say you remained always for me the face of Soviet Jewry that most represented the connection to Israel of all the people in the Soviet Union.

Yuli: Thank you! I really was completely…

Irwin: You were completely and thoroughly committed to Israel. It was remarkable, I have to say…

Yuli: It was even mystical to me. Without reading papers, I could feel when something bad happened in Israel as well as when something good happened in Israel.

Irwin: It was a mystical connection to Israel.

Yuli: Exactly… It was like my soul was living in Israel… while I was physically still in Russia…

Irwin: I never forgot that when I met you….I said my G-d, it was like someone from Israel came to the Soviet Union but it was the opposite way. It was someone in the Soviet Union who was dreaming of getting to Israel but whose soul was already in Israel and the body had to follow…

Yuli: It was miraculous reunification of my soul and my body here… and I was quite happy with the merger… Thank you very much!

Irwin: I’ll send you the stuff as soon as I get back. I’ll put it together and send it to you.

Yuli: My best to Ariella!