Formally, the schism was provoked by the visit to the KGB of Aleksandr Lunts, one of the movement’s leaders. Lunts initiated the idea of contacting the KGB, received the consent of other leaders of the movement’s “political wing” (Lerner, Slepak, and Voronel, but not Polskii, who at the time was busy with his trial), and implemented it himself. The break occurred toward the end of 1974, when the “secret” contacts came out in the open. In the refuseniks’ eyes, the KGB was branded by former and recent crimes and embodied universal evil. That institution issued refusals with no explanation or time limit, instigated harassment at work places, conducted anti-Zionist trials against people whose sole desire was to immigrate to Israel, persecuted refuseniks’ families, fired, trailed, bugged, intimidated and turned people against each other, broke them and then recruited them. Yet, the KGB, in fact, regulated and controlled emigration from the Soviet Union, analyzed the situation, and proposed decisions to the political leadership. Although we understood that the “organs” held the real power in issues of emigration, we addressed our protests, requests, and complaints, including those against the KGB, to the party and open governmental institutions.

Viktor Polskii was the activists’ chief representative in dealing with the Israeli establishment (the Liaison Bureau or Lishkat hakesher). Acting in a responsible and a balanced manner, his views on the aliya struggle coincided with those of the Bureau. When he made aliya and handed matters over to Vladimir Prestin, that meant that Prestin became the recognized leader of the movement fromIsrael’s point of view.

In Israelthey were not overly fond of the politiki because they acted independently, didn’t listen to the recommendations from Israel, supported the Jackson-Vanik Amendment too openly and loudly, cooperated with the democratic dissidents, and accordingly, did not speak out against neshira. The Bureau considered the politiki’s behavior too risky for themselves and for the movement as a whole.

On the other hand, the Bureau workers were not particularly fond of the kulturniki, either. Of course, they welcomed the Hebrew study and Zionist samizdat and tamizdat, but they were not enraptured by the attempts at domestic cultural activity, which they viewed as unrealistic, dangerous, and distracting the Jews from aliya toIsrael. At the time, hardly anyone believed in the possibility of a Jewish national life in theSoviet Union.

Your contacts with the KGB evoked a serious split in the refusenik community, I commented to Aleksandr Lunts.

Perhaps, but it was more a pretext than the cause for the split. Post factum, however, I concluded that it was a mistake and I shouldn’t have tried it. Then, however, I thought that we must obtain a meeting with the KGB at a sufficiently high level and explain certain circumstances to them. I discussed it with three colleagues in the movement: Slepak, Lerner, and Voronel.

When did it take place?

At the beginning of 1974. I assumed that if the meeting was on a sufficiently high level, they would have to report it to the appropriate superior in the hierarchy. All three agreed that it could facilitate a change in policy.

Did you all understand how dangerous it was?

Oh, Voronel reacted immediately: “I also had that idea but I think it’s dangerous.” Voronel, by the way, is not a coward.

I wrote a text and typed it up.

Did you coordinate the text?

I don’t remember now, but we did agree on the idea. The text said that the Jackson Amendment was proposed because of the harsh restrictions imposed on the emigration of Soviet Jews and that, as result, the ties that the Americans were trying to establish with the socialist camp would not be established with the Soviet Union but withChina, and all the benefits as well.

That is, you tried to play power politics with the KGB?

Yes. In the first discussion, I conversed with an intelligent person, seemingly, someone with a high rank. I immediately declared that I represent only myself but if there were positive results, I could, apparently, convince people close to me. At the next meeting I conversed with the head of the entire Jewish division. Even now I don’t know his last name. He was called Viktor Ivanovich. There were a total of four conversations.

How did it start? You transmitted a letter to someone with a request for a meeting?

No, I didn’t send a letter to anyone. I simply dropped in at their reception room, waited in line for five minutes, and was received by some man. I declared that I wanted to meet with a high-ranking representative. Subsequently, they contacted me. At the third meeting, Viktor Ivanovich began to yell at some point but, already having been tempered by my time in refusal, I simply listened and when he finished, I said that I could change my opinion in one of two cases: if I received some kind of positive information or was intimidated. The positive information was not forthcoming and I had not been intimidated…. In reply was silence.

What did he yell about?

About the harm, the danger, that it was treason─those kind of things. At the end of the fourth meeting, I said that I would not continue these meetings. And at that it ended. Subsequently, when Pasha Abramovich was at Mark Nashpits’ apartment, KGB men arrived, and one of them said to Pasha, “You’d do better also to come and speak with us, like Nashpits and Lunts.”

Nashpits?

He had entirely independent ideas.

In connection with his father, who remained in the West? He, after all, was detained in revenge for that.

Perhaps, but everything started after that sentence. When Polskii heard about it, he called a meeting at Lerner’s home. Lerner, Slepak, Polskii, Prestin and some one else were there. Polskii and Prestin attacked, but Lerner, not very actively but confidently spoke in defense, saying there was no harm in it, some attempt had been tried…. That’s how the schism began.

There were far-reaching consequences. The activists split into opposing groups not only in Moscow but also in many cities in the Soviet Union. Prestin considers that he was considerably at fault in this regard. He took charge when Polskii left.

Yes, he was in the group that had been active practically since 1968. Prestin and I, in fact, were not in contact. When Volodia arrived inIsrael, however, after many years and we first met, I remember that he entered the room and we simultaneously said almost the same thing: that we regretted all the arguments.

What was your reaction at the height of the schism when young fellows began actively to oppose you? Or did you simply not pay any attention to it?

And how I paid attention! I thought, however, that any active struggle would harm them and us. I considered that the best thing was not to respond, in the hope that everything would calm down, although that did not occur. I didn’t say anything to the correspondents. After the scandal with the senators, Robert Toth began trying to persuade me to talk about it. He said, “If you won’t tell me, then someone else will and he will distort it.” In short, he convinced me and recounted everything fairly correctly. I named three people with whom I had discussed the idea and who completely supported it. He asked me, “If they had agreed to your demands, what would you have done for them?” I replied: “Then we would have supported not applying the Jackson Amendment sanctions to theSoviet Union. ”Toth wrote that, although, in fact, not so accurately, saying that we would have then supported any agreements with the Americans, but it’s unimportant…

I remember that when Polskii and Voronel arrived inIsrael, they kicked up a fuss over this matter. Polskii turned to the Shin Bet (the Israeli secret security agency) and told them that I was cooperating with the KGB. When I arrived later on and told Nehemiah Levanon that I had undertaken such an initiative, he sent me to talk about it with the Shin Bet.

The Shin bet conversed with many people.

I have no complaints against Levanon in this matter. Later on, as Voronel told me, he not only did not complain about me but fervently supported the view that I was a decent person. He went to the Shin Bet and supported me. As he told me, there he was told: “Well, if Lunts’ chief opponent talks about him that way, then…” Now I think it was a mistake because with the KGB it… is like being in shit.

The Hebrew teacher Mikhail Chlenov pointed out in a conversation with me that the schism over contacts with the KGB occurred not because of those contacts but was a split between politiki and kulturniki. He told me[1]:

Faced with the question of how to deal with those who were not leaving, I thought that we should try to negotiate with the Soviet regime rather than fight against it. I think that I was the first in that milieu who formulated such an approach. It coincided with a very dubious episode in my fate that caused me some discomfort. The fact is that Lunts was not the only one who tried to reach an agreement with the KGB; I was almost involved in a similar story. A colleague in myInstituteofEthnography, Stanislav Korolev, was a former KGB officer, something that he did not conceal. Once, at a drinking session, he approached me and said, “I know that you teach Hebrew and so forth…. That interests us, and we would like to talk. … We would like to arrange some contact with you, perhaps with your friends, with circles….”

“The KGB,” I said,” is not the organization that we dreamed of contacting. We include Prisoners of Zion, refuseniks. Contact with the Central Committee, for example, would be another matter and of some interest.” “Our chief, Andropov,” he said, “is a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee. … Think about it and let’s organize a meeting between Andropov and those whom you name.”

He was a person on such a high level?

He was lying, of course. I therefore said that it was awkward. I asked, “What would we, in fact, speak about?” “We would like to know more about your movement, what are its goals, and so forth,” he said. I decided to assemble a small group.

Polskii, Slepak?

No, they weren’t involved. Almost no one is aware of what I am going to tell you now. I invited several people with whom I was very close─Eliahu Essas, Sasha Voronel, Mikhail Agurskii, and a few others─people with intellectual potential. I didn’t invite Rubin although that would have been natural because I feared that he would drive me away as soon as he heard the words “KGB” and “Andropov.” Rubin was considerably older than me─by 15-16 years─and had endured German captivity and Soviet labor camps. …

I told those fellows that there was an opportunity and I knew a person who wanted to act as an intermediary for us. And I also said that it seemed to me that it was even more important to put together some kind of platform than to meet with Andropov. “Let’s sit down and try to understand what our movement represents, what, in fact, we want.”… We immediately agreed that it was a matter only of our group; no one else should know, and we began to meet.

Did anyone fault you for this later?

No, it remained a forgotten and unknown episode, but to my mind it was important.

Was there a meeting?

No. I asked Stas Korolev about it a couple of times. He said, “Yes, yes,” and then I stopped asking him.

Did you give him a document?

No. We didn’t work out a final version but I kept some drafts.

What was the document’s basic idea?

The basic idea was that our movement, which had surprisingly formed in the Soviet Union, was a Jewish national movement whose goal was to assure both the freedom of repatriation toIsraeland the development of cultural activity and normal Jewish existence as a national group in theSoviet Union.

The rivalry between the two groups drew in more and more activists, spread to other cities, and sometimes manifested unpleasant facets.

I turned to Volodia Prestin: Polskii left and “annointed” you to “rule” and the big split occurred. I remember that one of the main topics at our meetings was the harsh opposition to Lunts and his supporters. The attempt secretly to negotiate with the KGB in those conditions was, possibly, naïve and even nasty but was it worth it to break apart the movement because of it?

To this day I don’t understand it; what he did should not have provoked such a scandal. Our mistake was not our negative attitude toward his deed but, rather, the form in which it was expressed. If I had known then, what I understood two years later, we never would have let things reach a schism.

Did you know that Lerner supported Lunts?

Of course I knew. … I was not sufficiently experienced. I thought that we would speak with Lunts and Lerner and explain to them…. Let them go their way, we wouldn’t bother them, but Lunts had to cease directing this process.

In other words, a typical power struggle? Lunts, who appeared much later, rises like a meteor, takes the initiative in his hands, locks up all the connections inside the country and abroad. And then he commits an act that, from our point of view, was morally unacceptable.

Not at all true. There was no power struggle. Polskii not only anointed me, but he also supplied me with what was needed. I was completely independent. You understand, I got started in these matters earlier. For those who entered the movement later, the KGB represented not so much the tough operative in harsh situations as merely the polite soldier who saluted at the departure gate at Sheremetevo airport. A lot had changed during that time. It’s impossible to imagine that someone would have gone to speak with the KGB five years earlier, in 1970.

Did you restore relations with Lerner and Slepak?

Yes, I was forty-one years old and it seemed that my evaluations of social relations were more or less correct. I trusted them based on previous experience.

It seems you quelled the interpersonal conflicts with the aid of Dale Carnegie’s famed book, “How to Win Friends and Influence People”.

No way! At some point, you went off to the side and got actively involved in Hebrew. The conflict had gone so far that it began to seem idiotic. Truly idiotic─when we didn’t want to meet in the same room with the senators. It was necessary to find a way out and I felt some responsibility. At some point a conflict arose with Dina Beilina over what someone said. Volodia Albrekht said, “Write her a letter,” and he explained the basic approach and how to write it.

Why did this particular conflict upset you?

I was upset by the never-ending nonsense with which I had to learn to cope. Albrekht’s idea seemed logical, and I wrote her a letter, which I gave her the following Saturday. A week passed and she told me: “You know, Volodia, if this incident is closed, I’m ready to forget about it.” I felt that his advice was working: I wrote and she responded calmly. I was also calm with her although, by nature, as you know, I am a temperamental person. Encouraged by the results, I wrote a letter to Lunts about our relations but he didn’t reply and he left the country. Pasha Abramovich later had a problem with someone and he asked me what to do. I said to him: “Look, write a letter.” He came to me again because he was having trouble writing the letter. It was in 1975, when I was working as an elevator operator in a residential building. There was a reception room there. It was marvelous work. Fantastic! I had free time. I worked for 24 hours every four days, studied psychology, read in English; there were interesting books. I began to explain to Pasha why it worked and gradually convinced him. When Pasha understood it, I already had a prepared theory of conflict resolution. Subsequently I spoke often on that topic. I traveled toLeningrad, where there was a serious conflict between four activists, then I spoke in Aba Taratuta’s group, then in another place, and afterwards I traveled toRiga.

All the time on the topic of the split?

Not specifically on our split but on behavior theory in conflict situations. Indeed, there were groupings in all the cities. InMoscowI delivered this lecture at Azbel’s seminar and then at Lerner’s seminar. Ultimately, I succeeded in changing the situation throughout theUSSR. People stopped speaking about a split. It was as if I expiated my guilt.

What did you hear from Israel about this?

Nothing.

The Americans sent a mediator, Joe Smukler, do you remember?

Unfortunately, he didn’t succeed. We resolved the conflict ourselves in the course of a year and a half and acquired invaluable experience and theoretical knowledge. For the rest of the time we lived rather peaceably.